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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the common, recurrent and distressing nature of nonclinical paranoia 
(Ellett, Lopes, & Chadwick, 2003), its concurrent and prospective relationship 
with theoretically relevant cognitive processes has not been comprehensively 
researched (Lincoln, Mobius, Huber, Nagel, & Moritz, 2014). Existing research 
heavily relies on cross-sectional designs, therefore preventing examination of 
the temporal and dynamic relationship between paranoia and putative 
cognitive predictors (Freeman, Stahl, McManus, Meltzer, Brugha, Wiles, et al., 
2012). Knowledge of the relationship between paranoia and maladaptive 
behaviours thought to contribute to its maintenance is also limited (Lincoln et 
al., 2014). This study aimed to address these gaps by a) cross-sectionally 
examining the association between paranoia, three theoretically relevant 
cognitive factors (i.e. public self-consciousness, rumination, and mindfulness), 
and a global measure of problem behaviour, b) prospectively examining the 
temporal and dynamic relationships between paranoia and the three cognitive 
factors over 2 weeks, and c) examining the prediction of idiosyncratic 
paranoia experiences, as measured by the Personal Experiences of Paranoia 
Scale (PEPS; Ellett et al., 2003) from pre-defined trait and state measures of 
paranoia and the three cognitive factors. 
At baseline, university students (N=86) completed trait measures of paranoia, 
the three cognitive factors and a global measure of problem behaviour. 
Subsequently, state measures of paranoia and the three cognitive factors 
were completed at three random time points over 2 weeks. The PEPS was 
then completed at 2 weeks follow-up. 
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Four key findings emerged: (1) at the trait level, paranoia positively associated 
with public self-consciousness, rumination, and problem behaviours, and 
negatively associated with mindfulness; (2) trait paranoia predicted variability 
in state paranoia over 2 weeks; (3) state measures of paranoia, public self-
awareness, rumination and mindfulness correlated over the 2-week period, 
and (4) trait public self-consciousness predicted endorsement of paranoid 
experiences at 2 weeks follow-up. 
The findings support contemporary models of delusion formation and 
maintenance (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002; 
Chadwick, 2006), and provide a foundation for further research into the 
dynamic processes underlying the onset and persistence of paranoid thinking.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Overview 
Paranoia is an everyday thought process, characterised by suspiciousness, 
hostility assumptions, self-centeredness and conspiratorial intent (Ellett & 
Chadwick, 2007). There is growing evidence to suggest that paranoia lies on 
a continuum, ranging from milder variants such as mistrust and suspicion, to 
severe forms such as psychotic delusions (Freeman, 2007; Freeman, Pugh, 
Vorontsova, Antley, & Slater, 2010). 
Public self-consciousness, rumination and mindfulness have been 
theoretically implicated in the formation and maintenance of paranoid 
cognitions (Chadwick, 2006; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992; Freeman et al., 
2012). However, only a few studies have investigated these cognitive 
processes in the context of nonclinical paranoia (Lincoln et al., 2014). Given 
the common, recurrent and distressing nature of nonclinical paranoia, this is 
an important area to investigate further (Freeman, McManus, Brugha, Meltzer, 
Jenkins, & Bebbington, 2011). Of the existing research, the predominance of 
cross-sectional designs has limited the extent to which the psychological 
mechanisms underlying nonclinical paranoia can be explored, over time 
(Freeman et al., 2012). Naturalistic prospective designs can help advance 
knowledge in this area by enabling an examination of dynamic processes that 
affect nonclinical paranoia over time (Myin-Germeys, Oorschot, Collip, 
Lataster, Delespaul, & van Os, 2009). A key aim of this study, therefore, was 
to examine the concurrent and predictive association between public self-
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consciousness, rumination, mindfulness and paranoia, at the trait and state 
level, over a 2-week period using a prospective naturalistic design. In addition 
to assessing state and trait paranoia via pre-defined questionnaires, this study 
captured phenomenological accounts of paranoia by utilising the PEPS (Ellett 
et al., 2003), which emphasises the subjective and multifaceted nature of 
paranoia (Stopa, Denton, Wingfield, & Tayor, 2013). Considering the current 
limited knowledge of the relationship between paranoia and theoretically 
relevant behaviours (Lincoln et al., 2014), another aim of the study was to 
investigate its association with a global measure of problem behaviours.
This chapter introduces the definition of paranoia, its conceptualisation 
according to the continuum view, and its occurrence in nonclinical 
populations. The theoretical and clinical relevance of studying correlates and 
predictors of paranoia will then be discussed, followed by a review of 
conceptual models and empirical work emphasising the role of public self-
consciousness, rumination, and mindfulness. The theoretical relevance of 
problem behaviours to delusion formation and maintenance and the limited 
evidence supporting their association with paranoia will also be reviewed. The 
methodological challenges of cross-sectional and pre-defined questionnaire-
based research are then discussed. Rationales for the adoption of naturalistic 
prospective designs to study the dynamic relationship between paranoia and 
theoretically relevant cognitive factors, and for paranoia measurement using 
pre-defined and phenomenological assessment methods will then be 
presented. The chapter will conclude by considering how the current 
hypotheses attempt to address the identified gaps i
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1.2. Paranoia 
1.2.1. Definition  
Paranoid cognitions have been described as everyday psychological 
experiences rather than just a diagnostic symptom indicative of mental illness 
(Ellett et al., 2003). The common occurrence of paranoid thinking in the 
general population (Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith, Rollinson, Fowler, 
et al., 2005) is consistent with a paradigm shift whereby the prevalent 
emphasis on categorical/diagnostic approaches to mental health difficulties 
has been gradually replaced by an increased interest in 
dimensional/continuum views of experience (Esterberg & Compton, 2008). In 
fact, there is now robust evidence supporting the idea that paranoia exists on 
a continuum, ranging from milder variants (e.g. mistrust and suspicion) to 
severe forms (e.g. persecutory delusions) (Freeman et al., 2010; van Os, 
Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 2009).   
A number of issues have been highlighted as posing challenges to the 
definition of paranoia. One challenging issue concerns the difficulties with 
judging ‘falsity’ of paranoid beliefs if adopting a traditional conceptualisation to 
clinically define paranoia (Heckers, Barch, Bustillo, Gaebel, Gur, Malaspina, 
et al., 2013). According to this traditional view, paranoid thinking is defined as 
a broad range of unfounded, unsupported, or unwarranted beliefs that one is 
or will be subject to harm by someone or something (e.g. an organisation, 
force or power) (e.g. National Institute of Mental Health: NIMH, 2009; World 
Health Organisation: WHO, 1992). However, reliable assessment of 
unfounded beliefs is rather difficult given the higher likelihood that previous 
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real victimisation experiences underlie their occurrence (Fowler, Freeman, 
Smith, Kuipers, Bebbington, Bashford, et al., 2006), and the considerable 
variation characterising the content of such beliefs (Freeman, 2008).  
Another issue surrounding the definition of paranoia is that it has become 
increasingly apparent that paranoia is a complex and multidimensional 
phenomenon (Ellett et al., 2003). This is also consistent with Freeman’s 
(2007) view of the individual variability in a range of factors characterising 
persecutory delusions, including content of delusional belief(s), degree of 
conviction, distress, and resistance to change. Consequently, calls have been 
made for research to examine the phenomenology of paranoid experiences 
and how the different dimensions characterising such experiences relate to 
other psychological factors/processes (Campbell & Morrison, 2007; Freeman, 
2007).   
The adoption of a continuum approach has also led to new challenges in 
defining paranoia, as the term is commonly used to incorporate a wider set of 
experiences, ranging from nonclinical phenomena (i.e. paranoid-like 
experiences/beliefs/thinking), to clinically diagnosable variants (i.e. paranoid 
or persecutory delusions). Consequently, there is lack of clarity linked to this 
diverse terminology, whereby there is no consensual agreement as to how 
each term is defined, related to or distinguishable from one another (Freeman, 
2007).  
The definition of paranoia has also faced the challenging task of successfully 
establishing its distinctiveness from other anxiety-related disorders such as 
social anxiety, given that both conditions involve perceptions of interpersonal 
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threat (Ellett et al., 2003). Both paranoid and socially anxious individuals 
share concerns about being subject to negative judgement by others, 
scanning for socially threatening cues in the environment, and viewing other 
people’s motives and behaviour as directed towards oneself (Rietdijk, van Os, 
de Graff, Delespaul, & van der Gaag, 2009). Nevertheless, in paranoia, 
intentional malevolence of others is the main source of social threat, whereas 
in social anxiety, the individual’s own social inadequacies are most 
characteristic of such threat (Gilbert, Boxall, Cheung, & Irons, 2005). 
To address the difficulties highlighted above, Freeman and Garety (2000) 
advanced a more detailed definition of paranoia (full details in Table 1 below), 
whereby a specific set of criteria helps identify what constitutes a paranoid 
belief. 
Table 1. Criteria for identifying paranoid beliefs (Freeman & Garety, 
2000)    
Criteria A and B must be met: 
______________________________________________________________ 
A. The individual believes that harm is occurring, or is going to occur, to him 
or her 
B. The individual believes that the persecutor has the intention to cause harm 
There are a number of points for clarification: 
______________________________________________________________ 
1. Harm concerns any action that leads to the individual feeling distressed 
2. Harm only to friends or relatives does not count as a persecutory belief, 
unless the persecutor also intends for this to have a negative effect upon the 
individual 
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3. The individual must believe that the persecutor, at present or in the future, 
will attempt to harm him or her 
4. Delusions of reference do not count within the category of persecutory 
beliefs 
From: Freeman, D., & Garety, P. (2000). Comments on the content of 
persecutory delusions: Does the definition need clarification? British Journal 
of Clinical Psychology, 39, p. 412 
 
Key advantages attached to Freeman and Garety’s (2000) definition concern 
a) the normalisation of paranoia, as persecutory beliefs are not viewed as 
evidence of mental illness and/or intrinsically representative of 
unfounded/false or delusional experiences; b) establishing its differentiation 
from other anxiety disorders such as social anxiety, and c) clarifying its 
phenomenological variability by incorporating different 
situations/thoughts/feelings underlying fear of intentional harm by others.   
These particular aspects of Freeman and Garety’s (2000) definition make it an 
appropriate and useful definition within the context of this thesiswhich 
concerns the investigation of paranoia in a nonclinical student sample. Thus, 
in keeping with the continuum view, the term ‘nonclinical paranoia’ will be 
used within the current thesis to refer to paranoid-like thoughts, whereas 
‘persecutory delusions’ will refer to clinical symptoms of paranoia.  
1.2.2. The ‘continuum view’ 
Underlying current understanding of psychosis-related symptoms (including 
paranoia) are categorical and continuum approaches to psychopathology. The 
categorical approach has been incorporated into diagnostic systems such as 
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the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition (DSM-5; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and the International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD; WHO, 1992), currently on its 11th revision (Gaebel, Zielasek, 
& Cleveland, 2013).  Inherent to these systems is the idea that symptoms 
characterising clinical disorders qualitatively differ from those seen in 
nonclinical populations. Although the categorical approach has been 
instrumental in advancing knowledge of the aetiology, treatment and 
management of clinical disorders (Lawrie, Hall, McIntosh, Owens, & 
Johnstone, 2010), some of its key limitations have also been highlighted. The 
latter include the risk of overlooking inter-individual symptom heterogeneity 
and failure to account for high comorbidity between disorders (Lawrie et al., 
2010).     
 
In contrast, the continuum approach suggests that psychopathology 
experiences are not qualitatively different from “normal” experience (Costello, 
1994) and emphasises the value of studying individual symptoms as opposed 
to broad and heterogeneous diagnostic categories. Within this approach, a 
distinction between the phenomenological and the vulnerability view has also 
been made (Costello, 1994). In the context of psychosis, the 
phenomenological view stipulates that compared to clinical populations, less 
intense, persistent and debilitating psychotic symptoms are experienced by 
nonclinical populations, whereas the vulnerability view suggests that 
frequency and severity of ‘psychosis like’ symptoms index within-person 
vulnerability to subsequent psychotic disorder.   
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The continuum view has been empirically supported by research indicating 
that psychological mechanisms in both healthy and clinical populations are 
not as dissimilar from each other as previously thought (Claridge, 1987; 
McGovern & Turkington, 2001). The dimensional account of delusions has 
also been supported by large survey studies examining the demographic, 
economic, social and clinical correlates of paranoia in the general population 
(e.g. Freeman et al., 2011; Bebbington, McBride, Steel, Kuipers, 
Radovanovic, Brugha, et al., 2013). For example, in their 2011 British survey 
study which assessed 7281 participants, Freeman and colleagues identified a 
hierarchy of paranoia containing three different levels of severity, with less 
frequent but more severe paranoid beliefs building on from more common but 
milder variants. The authors also reported that across all levels of severity (i.e. 
from suspiciousness to persecutory delusions), paranoia was associated with 
younger age, lower cognitive functioning, physical health problems, social 
stressors (e.g. poverty) and psychiatric symptoms (e.g. suicidal ideation). As 
suggested by these findings, nonclinical paranoia can significantly impact 
individuals’ health, emotional wellbeing and social functioning (Freeman et al., 
2011). These findings are also consistent with evidence from other studies 
(e.g. Combs, Michael, & Penn, 2006; Freeman et al., 2010; Vermissen, 
Janssen, Myin-Germeys, Mengelers, a Campo, van Os, et al., 2008).  
Research has also identified a range of affective and cognitive variables, 
which although postulated to contribute to formation and maintenance of 
clinical paranoia, also appear implicated in nonclinical paranoia. For example, 
both cross-sectional and experimental research with nonclinical populations 
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has found that anxiety, depression, low self-esteem, attentional biases to 
threat related information and attributional biases are all associated with 
paranoia (e.g. Allen, Freeman, Johns, & McGuire, 2006; Cohen, Magai, 
Yaffee, & Walcott-Brown, 2004; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992; Freeman et al., 
2005; see also section 1.3. below, p. 23 below). 
Longitudinal research has also tested the dimensional view of paranoia by 
investigating whether nonclinical paranoid ideation can be a precursor for 
subsequent psychotic disorder. In one study, 25% of 11 year olds reporting 
mild psychotic symptoms were given a clinical diagnosis of psychotic disorder 
when aged 26 years old (Poulton, Caspi, Moffitt, Cannon, Murray, & 
Harrington, 2000). The authors concluded that the mechanisms underlying the 
beliefs endorsed by the children who participated in their study were unlikely 
to be qualitatively different from those underlying the beliefs experienced by 
the same individuals at 26 years of age. Instead, the authors proposed that 
their findings are suggestive of shifts in psychotic-related symptoms along a 
continuum of severity. Similarly, Hanssen, Bak, Bijl, Vollebergh, and van Os 
(2005) reported persistence rates of 16% for subclinical psychotic symptoms 
over a two-year period, with half of these transitioning from subclinical to 
clinical psychotic states. This finding is also consistent with a follow-up study 
reporting transition rates between 8-10% (Wiles, Zammit, Bebbington, 
Singleton, Meltzer, & Lewis, 2006). Together, this evidence suggests that 
although a proportion of the population may experience paranoia that will 
never reach clinical severity levels, a lower proportion of individuals will 
experience a continuation from mild to more severe paranoia over time.  
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Notwithstanding the substantial evidence supporting the continuum view (e.g. 
Freeman et al., 2005; van Os et al., 2009), the debate surrounding the 
categorical vs. dimensional nature of psychotic symptoms is far from being 
resolved (David, 2010). Arguments in favour and against both approaches 
have been put forward along with the recognition that a complementary 
approach combining both perspectives may help disentangle the complex 
nature of psychotic-related symptoms more effectively (DeRosse & Karlsgodt, 
2015).  Whilst the categorical approach may be particularly useful in 
identifying risk factors for psychotic disorders by examining heterogeneous 
clinical samples, the dimensional or continuum approach could be more 
suitable to advance knowledge of protective factors or resilience to these 
disorders by examining healthy populations exhibiting sub-clinical psychotic 
symptoms (DeRosse & Karlsgodt, 2015). Evidence supporting this view 
includes findings from Linscott and Van Os’ (2010) study, which 
systematically reviewed research on the prevalence of psychotic symptoms in 
the general population. The findings supported the continuum approach in 
that psychotic symptoms may not be restricted to diagnostic categories but 
rather appear to merge with less severe/sub-clinical and frequent experiences 
in the general population. However, support for the categorical approach was 
also found in that within the general population, different subgroups 
presenting with different levels of risk for psychotic disorder were also 
identified, therefore implying such risk is discontinuous with normality (Linscott 
& Van Os, 2010).   
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In summary, the research reviewed above broadly supports the idea that an 
attenuated form of paranoia is commonly experienced in the nonclinical 
population. A key implication of studying paranoia in nonclinical samples is 
that it can offer new insights into developmental processes and treatment of 
clinical delusions. Furthermore, this methodological approach is also 
advantageous in that it avoids several difficulties inherent in studying clinical 
populations, including confounding iatrogenic factors such as medication 
effects, institutionalisation, and cognitive decline (Galbraith, Manktelow, & 
Morris, 2008; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2005).  
 
1.2.3. How common is paranoia? 
Estimating the prevalence of paranoia in the general population is challenging 
given that rates vary depending on which measures are used to assess this 
construct and the characteristics of the samples studied (Freeman, 2007). 
Bearing this in mind, prevalence rates ranging between 1% (Eaton, 
Romanoski, Anthony, & Nestadt, 1991) and 18.6% (Freeman et al., 2011) 
have been reported. Notably, evidence from a systematic review of all 
prevalence studies undertaken between 1950 and 2007 showed that 1-3% of 
the general population experience paranoid beliefs of similar severity to those 
found in clinical groups (van Os et al., 2009). This review also identified 
different prevalence rates regarding presence of subclinical delusions 
associated with social and emotional difficulties (4%), and milder paranoid 
ideation (8%) (van Os et al., 2009). These findings also seem to apply to UK 
populations, as shown by a British study of a large representative sample of 
8580 participants aged 17 to 64 years old (Johns, Cannon, Singleton, Murray, 
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Farrell, Brugha, et al., 2004). In this survey, 9% of the general population 
reported mild paranoid ideation (Johns et al., 2004). More recently, a study 
using data from the 2000 British National Psychiatric Morbidity Survey (total N 
= 8576) reported frequencies of different types of paranoid ideation ranging 
from less than 2% to almost 30% (Bebbington et al., 2013). These findings led 
the authors to conclude that “paranoia is so common as to be almost normal” 
(Bebbington et al., 2013, p. 425). 
Higher prevalence rates than those found in general population studies have 
also been reported by research examining paranoid ideation in student 
samples (Lincoln & Keller, 2008). For example, Ellett et al. (2003) found 47% 
of their student population (N=324) reported an experience of paranoia. 
Similarly, in a sample of 1202 English university students, 42% reported 
feeling negative comments about them were circulated on a weekly basis 
(Freeman et al., 2005). These differences in prevalence rates between both 
types of sample are potentially due to students not being fully representative 
of the general population in that they often differ from the latter on key factors 
such as age, education, and gender (Freeman, 2006). Nevertheless, student 
samples are easy to recruit which maximises opportunities for collecting 
further evidence supporting the continuity view, as well as identifying factors 
that elicit and maintain paranoia in nonclinical groups (Lincoln & Keller, 2008). 
Such opportunities are also valuable in their potential for helping us to 
understand the prevention and treatment of more severe levels of paranoia 
(Freeman et al., 2005). 
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1.3. Research on correlates and predictors of paranoia: theoretical and 
clinical relevance 
Consistent with the continuity view, research has shown that clinical and 
nonclinical paranoia share a number of correlates and predictors (see section 
1.2.2. above). Commonly identified correlates include socio-demographic and 
environmental variables such as age, male gender, cannabis use, low socio-
economic status and mental health difficulties (Freeman et al., 2011; Johns et 
al., 2004; van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli, 2000).  
Across the paranoia continuum evidence showing similarities in factors 
theoretically implicated in delusion formation and maintenance, has also been 
obtained. Most of this evidence concerns studies focusing on affective 
variables (e.g. anxiety and depression) or specific types of cognitive factors 
(e.g. jumping to conclusions and attributional biases) (Freeman et al., 2005; 
Freeman, Pugh, & Garety, 2008a; Kesting, & Lincoln, 2013), whereas less 
attention has been paid to other cognitive processes postulated to trigger and 
perpetuate delusional distress, as well as behavioural facets potentially 
involved in this process (Lincoln, Reumann, & Moritz, 2010; Moritz, & van 
Quaquebeke, 2014). In light of the recurrent and distressing nature of 
nonclinical paranoia (Ellett et al, 2003; Freeman et al., 2011), and bearing in 
mind the potential for putative causal and/or maintenance factors to delusional 
thinking to be translated into effective treatments (Freeman & Garety, 2014), 
advancing knowledge in this area not only has theoretical value but may also 
have key clinical implications.   
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In fact, a recent literature review covering studies of nonclinical and clinical 
paranoia since 1999, highlights that although this body of empirical work has 
contributed to advancing knowledge of delusion-related processes, there are 
still specific areas of inquiry that need to be addressed further. Specifically, 
recommendations are made for future research to focus on a range of 
theoretically relevant cognitive factors to paranoia including worry-related 
processes (e.g. rumination), negative views about the self and others 
(including feelings of interpersonal vulnerability), and processes thought to 
increase and maintain delusional distress at the cognitive (e.g. non-mindful 
coping) and behavioural levels (e.g. avoidance behaviours) (Freeman & 
Garety, 2014; Garety & Freeman, 2013). Increased understanding about how 
such processes relate and/or contribute to the development and/or 
maintenance of paranoia in both clinical and nonclinical populations can 
benefit the development of symptom-specific and theoretically-driven 
interventions (Freeman, 2011). Addressing this issue is currently pressing in 
light of the overall limited effectiveness of psychological interventions 
targeting clinical psychotic symptoms (Garety & Freeman, 2013). This is the 
case of first generation psychological treatments for psychosis such as 
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT), which have shown only a small to 
moderate effect size (Freeman, 2011). This is not entirely surprising given that 
traditionally, CBT’s particular emphasis is on shifting/changing the clients’ 
delusional beliefs, a notably difficult task to achieve (Oliver, O’Connor, Jose, 
McLachlan, & Peters, 2012a).  
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Representing a step forward from traditional approaches to psychosis 
treatment, are more integrative interventions which rather than exclusively 
focusing on reducing symptoms (i.e. the psychotic experience itself), are 
aimed instead at mitigating symptom-related distress by encouraging the 
development of adaptive responses (at cognitive, affective and/or behavioural 
levels) to distressing psychotic experiences (Chadwick, 2014; Garety & 
Freeman, 2013; Hepworth, Startup, & Freeman, 2011; Oliver et al., 2012a). 
Examples of such interventions include ‘third wave’ behavioural and cognitive 
therapies such as Mindfulness-based programmes (Chadwick, 2014) and 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 
1999) approaches. Central to these approaches is the notion that encouraging 
the development of adaptive mindful self-focused attention (as opposed to 
ruminative self-focus) and acceptance of present-moment experience can 
promote a healthier relationship with one’s difficult and painful experiences, 
which in turn leads to a reduction in distress and increased emotional and 
behavioural self-regulation (Baer, 2009; Hayes, Follette, & Linehan, 2011). In 
other words, the tendency to inflexibly and repetitively focus on the content of 
unpleasant internal and/or external stimuli and being non-accepting of such 
experiences by engaging in a range of cognitive, emotional and/or 
behavioural strategies to avoid or suppress them (a process also known as 
experiential avoidance), are the hypothesized key mechanisms associated 
and contributing to emergence and maintenance of psychological distress. In 
this sense, mindfulness and acceptance-based approaches to treatment are 
expected to be beneficial for individuals presenting with a range of 
psychological difficulties characterized by rigid and inflexible self-focused 
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attentional styles, a general tendency to ruminate and increased propensity to 
engage in maladaptive behaviour as attempts to reduce distress (Baer, 2009).  
In relation to psychosis-related symptoms, there is an emerging evidence-
base suggesting the potential role of experiential avoidance-related processes 
such as those highlighted above in contributing to onset and maintenance of 
delusional ideation in both clinical and nonclinical samples (e.g. Goldstone, 
Farhall & Ong, 2011; Udachina, Thewissen, Myin-Germeys, Fitzpatrick, 
O’Kane, & Bentall, 2009; Udachina, Varese, Myin-Germeys, & Bentall, 2014). 
Collectively, this evidence shows that more experientially avoidant individuals 
are also more likely to experience distressing delusions, regardless of 
whether they have been given a psychosis diagnosis (Godstone et al., 2011), 
and experiential avoidance predicts future occurrence of delusional thinking in 
both clinical and nonclinical populations (Udachina et al., 2009; Udachina et 
al., 2014). Adding to this evidence is the outcome of clinical intervention trials 
suggesting the effectiveness of mindfulness and acceptance-based 
treatments in reducing distress from psychotic symptoms by increasing a 
flexible, non-judgemental and accepting stance towards these undesirable 
experiences (Bach & Hayes, 2002; Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006). However, the 
evidence-base for these ‘third wave’ approaches to psychosis treatment is still 
developing as well as relying on the hypothesised association between 
psychosis symptoms (including paranoia) and experiential avoidance related 
processes, which is yet to be comprehensively researched (Cavanagh, 
Strauss, Forder, & Jones, 2014; Chadwick, 2014; Udachina et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, of the range of maladaptive cognitive, affective and/or 
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behavioural responses to distressing experiences (e.g. rigid self-focused 
attentional style, rumination, problem behaviours) characterising processes of 
experiential avoidance, it is currently unclear which of these responses are 
more consistently associated with and predictive (both cross-sectionally and 
prospectively) of psychotic symptoms along the continuum of severity. As 
previously mentioned, pursuing this line of inquiry may not only help to identify 
specific factors reliably associated with distressing psychotic symptoms but 
can also potentially inform which domains may constitute key intervention 
targets (Garety & Freeman, 2013).  
In light of the considerations above, this study will focus on four main 
variables implicated in the emergence and maintenance of paranoid 
cognitions by theoretical models which implicitly and/or explicitly emphasise 
experiential avoidance as one of the underlying mechanisms driving this 
process (Chadwick, 2006; Freeman et al., 2002; Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, 
Fowler, Bebbington, & Dunn, 2007). These four variables refer to three 
specific cognitive processes – a self-focused attentional style known as self-
consciousness, rumination and mindfulness – and a behavioural factor - 
problem behaviours. The less well-established relationship between clinical 
and nonclinical paranoia and each of these factors and their yet poorly 
understood role in the development and persistence of paranoid thinking is 
the main focus of discussion in the following sections below.  
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1.3.1. Self-consciousness 
Self-consciousness describes a rigid and ruminative attention style, whereby 
one is unable to defocus from his/her own internal and/or external 
experiences, especially if these are perceived as having a negative impact 
upon the individual (McKenzie & Hoyle, 2008). In earlier writings, two distinct 
forms of this self-focussed attentional style were identified: private and public 
self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Sheier, & Buss, 1975). Whereas private self-
consciousness concerns focusing attention on internal aspects of the self 
such as values or personal motives, public self-consciousness refers to 
focusing on aspects of the self, which are presented to others such as 
appearance and social behaviour (Fenigstein et al., 1975). A number of 
studies have established a reliable association between high self-
consciousness and diverse psychopathology including mood and anxiety 
disorders (Morrison & Haddock, 1997).  
Early clinical observations of individuals with paranoid personalities 
(Kraepelin, 1915; cited in Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) suggested that high 
self-consciousness may relate to paranoia. This association fits in with an 
influential model of delusion formation and maintenance, which implicates 
high self-consciousness as having a key role in this process (Freeman et al., 
2002). According to this model, anxiety gives rise to threat beliefs underlying 
paranoid thinking and leads to negative interpretations of ambiguous events; 
these effects are in turn exacerbated and maintained by high self-
consciousness, whereby sustained and inflexible attentional focus on the self, 
increases the sense of self as a target of others’ malicious thoughts or actions 
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(Freeman et al., 2007). Consistent with this view is Laing’s (1969) notion of 
suspiciousness as a defining characteristic of self-consciousness, whereby 
increased attentiveness to oneself as presented to others may contribute to 
emergence of irrational misinterpretations linked to feelings of over-exposure 
and/or vulnerability (von Gemmingen, Sullivan, & Pomerantz, 2003).  
There is some evidence supporting the theoretical relevance of self-
consciousness to clinical psychotic presentations or symptoms (e.g. 
Andersson, Orrell & Puente, 1984; Perona-Garcelan, Cuevas-Yust, Garcia-
Montes, Perez-Alvarez, Ductor-Recuerda, Salas-Azcona, et al., 2008; Smari, 
Stefansson, & Thorgilsson, 1994). However, most of the research on self-
consciousness and paranoia has been in nonclinical populations. For 
example, in their three-part study examining the association between self-
consciousness and paranoia in a student sample (N=581), Fenigstein and 
Vanable (1992) reported: a stable and strong association between public self-
consciousness and paranoia (part I); participants high in trait paranoia were 
more likely to report feelings of being observed than those with low levels of 
this trait (part II), and when experimentally manipulating self-consciousness 
by allocating participants to a high vs. low self-conscious group, those in the 
former group were more likely to feel that they were being observed than 
participants in the latter group (part III). These findings along with Fenigstein’s 
(1984) previous work, led the authors to suggest that public self-
consciousness significantly influences the extent to which individuals make 
paranoid inferences about others’ motivations and behaviour, by perceiving 
themselves as being the intentional target of such motives or actions. This 
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distorted perception or ‘idea of reference’, also known as ‘the self-as-target’ 
bias, was also highlighted as corresponding to an information processing style 
characterising clinical paranoia (Greenwald, 1980; cited in Fenigstein & 
Vanable, 1992). 
Correlational studies in nonclinical samples have provided additional evidence 
of an association between public self-consciousness and trait paranoia (e.g. 
Combs & Penn, 2004; Martin & Penn, 2001; von Gemmingen et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, Fenigstein and Vanable (1992) also used an experimental 
design in their three-part study. Therefore, their findings allow some degree of 
causality to be inferred regarding the association between self-consciousness 
and paranoia and the underlying feeling of being watched characterising 
these phenomena. Further evidence supporting a potentially causal 
relationship between self-consciousness and paranoia has also been 
obtained in a study, which showed experimentally induced high self-
consciousness subsequently triggered increases in trait paranoia (Ellett & 
Chadwick, 2007).  
Regarding the association between self-consciousness and state paranoia, to 
date only Freeman, Dunn, Fowler, Bebbington, Kuipers, Emsley, et al. (2013) 
have shown evidence of such a link. Using a clinical sample of 130 delusional 
patients, this study examined the relationship between state paranoia and a 
range of affective and cognitive variables (including self-consciousness). 
Findings showed that higher state paranoia was associated with higher self-
consciousness (both private and public) as well as with higher levels of threat 
anticipation, negative interpretation of ambiguity, and negative self-beliefs. 
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Furthermore, when controlling for anxiety and depression, the association 
between state paranoia and the three abovementioned cognitive processes 
(i.e. threat anticipation, ambiguity interpretation and negative self-beliefs) no 
longer remained significant. Instead, only the association of state paranoia 
with public self-consciousness and attention on appearance to others 
remained significant when controlling for affective variables (Freeman et al., 
2013). Although causality cannot be inferred from this cross-sectional study, 
its findings do nevertheless highlight the strong link between current paranoid 
thinking and an attentional style marked by greater sensitivity to how one is 
coming across to others. However, the association between state paranoia 
and public self-consciousness in nonclinical paranoia remains unknown. 
Furthermore, to obtain more conclusive evidence of the theoretical 
contribution of self-consciousness to future occurrence of paranoia (both at 
trait and state levels), longitudinal designs examining the prospective 
relationship between these variables are needed.  
Freeman et al. (2013) also highlight the importance of studying a range of 
theoretically relevant cognitive processes in relation to paranoid thinking so as 
to identify which of these processes are key in triggering and/or maintaining 
psychotic symptoms (including paranoia) and therefore help inform clinical 
assessment and interventions. This call for increased theoretical integration 
has been adopted by recent studies such as the investigation by Perona-
Garcelan, Garcia-Montes, Lopez-Jimenez, Rodriguez-Testal, Ruiz-Veguilla, 
Ductor-Recuerda, et al. (2014). In this nonclinical study, results showed that 
students with high hallucination proneness not only had significantly higher 
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levels of self-consciousness (both private and public) but also had lower 
levels of mindfulness compared to the low hallucination proneness group. 
Furthermore, a stronger negative correlation was found between public self-
consciousness and mindfulness than between the latter and private self-
consciousness. Perona-Garcelan et al.’s (2014) findings are also relevant to 
paranoia in that they are consistent with models of distressing reactions to 
psychotic experiences (including persecutory delusions), which emphasise 
the role of adaptive and maladaptive responses which either 
ameliorate/minimise the negative impact of these painful sensations (e.g. 
mindfulness) or serve to increase/maintain the distress that accompanies 
them (e.g. ruminative self-focused attention) (Chadwick, 2006). Nevertheless, 
public self-consciousness and other cognitive factors theoretically implicated 
in delusion maintenance such as processes of mindfulness and rumination 
(Chadwick, 2006) are yet to be examined together in terms of their 
relationship with paranoia.  
1.3.2. Rumination 
Although theoretical conceptualisations of rumination vary across different 
research areas, a commonly used definition describes this construct as a 
process of responding to negative affect by passively and repetitively thinking 
about personal problems, their causes and consequences (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991). Rumination has also been defined as a repetitive negative thinking 
(RNT) process (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003) which, despite of its significant 
overlap with other forms of perseverative negative thinking such as worry, has 
nevertheless been shown to be a distinct construct from such related 
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processes (e.g. Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005). Whereas worry is 
characterized by anticipation of future threats, rumination focuses on negative 
past experiences and difficult emotions (Dickson, Ciesla, & Reilly, 2012). 
Rumination has been shown to be transdiagnostic in nature, affecting a range 
of Axis I and II disorders, including affective and anxiety disorders as well as 
psychosis (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004).  
Contemporary models of persecutory delusions identify rumination as an 
anxiety-related process maintaining threat beliefs and contributing to 
increased delusional distress (Chadwick, 2006; Freeman et al., 2007). 
According to one influential theoretical account, once suspicious thoughts are 
generated in the context of increased anxiety, they are likely to be kept in 
mind and become catastrophic in content through further appraisals of the 
threat belief(s) (i.e. rumination) a process that in turn, gives rise to and 
perpetuates the distress linked to such experiences (Freeman et al., 2007).  A 
similar model has also been proposed, which conceptualises rumination as 
one of the key dysfunctional coping strategies or distressing reactions to 
psychotic experiences (Chadwick, 2006). According to this model, rumination 
is a habitual reaction to unpleasant psychotic experiences, whereby 
individuals ‘get stuck’ in repetitive, circular and draining efforts to either avoid 
or resist/confront such distressing experiences (Chadwick, 2006). Consistent 
with Chadwick’s (2006) view is the suggestion that rumination may be a core 
component of experiential avoidance or unwillingness to experience negative 
thoughts, feelings or bodily sensations (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & 
Strosahl, 1996). In support of both Chadwick’s (2006) and Hayes et al.’s 
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(1996) conceptualisation of rumination is evidence from a number of studies 
showing its association with: a desire to disengage from/avoid problems 
(Dickson, Reilly, & Ciesla, 2011); non-acceptance (Liverant, Kamholz, Sloan, 
& Brown, 2011); dwelling on past stressful experiences (Watkins, 2004); 
evaluative brooding (Moberly & Watkins, 2008) and negative cognition (Ciesla 
& Roberts, 2007).  
Regarding the hypothesised relationship between rumination and paranoia, 
evidence supporting Freeman et al.’s (2002) and Chadwick’s (2006) 
theoretical views has also been obtained. For example, correlational research 
has shown that paranoid thinking is associated with rumination in nonclinical 
samples (Simpson, McGregor, Cavanagh, & Dudley, 2012). RNT has also 
been shown to predict both new occurrences and the persistence of existing 
paranoia in the general population (Freeman et al., 2011). Compared to other 
forms of RNT however, research has predominantly failed to consider the 
potential role of rumination in triggering and maintaining persecutory ideation 
(Martinelli, Cavanah, & Dudley, 2013; Simpson et al., 2012). Recently, a 
clinical study attempted to address this issue by investigating the prospective 
and dynamic relationship between persecutory delusions and rumination 
(Hartley, Haddock, Vasconcelos e Sa, Emsley, & Barrowclough, 2013). 
Results showed that in the short-term (i.e. over 6 days), antecedent 
momentary levels of rumination predicted current delusional ideation and 
distress, thus adding weight to the idea of rumination as a cognitive process 
which causes/influences persecutory ideation (Hartley et al., 2013).  
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To the author’s knowledge, two studies have investigated the association 
between rumination and nonclinical paranoia. In the first study, the 
relationship between rumination, safety behaviours (e.g. avoidance) and 
paranoia was cross-sectionally examined in a nonclinical (N=133) student 
sample (Simpson et al., 2012). Paranoia strongly correlated with both 
rumination (r = .46) and safety behaviours (r = .55), associations that were not 
accounted for by negative affect (i.e. anxiety and depression). Furthermore, 
when combined with age, gender and negative affect, rumination and safety 
behaviours explained 49% of the variance of paranoia. As for the independent 
contribution of rumination to paranoia over and above the other variables, 
rumination accounted for 12% of the variance, while safety behaviours 
accounted for 18% of the variance (Simpson et al., 2012). In the second 
study, which used an experimental design, paranoia was induced in a student 
sample (N = 37) and then measured before and after they engaged in a 
guided cognitive strategy task (i.e. rumination vs. distraction conditions) to 
examine if rumination (compared to distraction) would maintain or exacerbate 
state paranoia (Martinelli et al., 2013). As predicted, results showed that 
following a paranoia induction procedure rumination was associated with 
maintenance of state paranoia whereas distraction was associated with a 
decrease in paranoid thinking. Although this study makes a significant 
contribution towards demonstrating the potential causal relationship between 
rumination and nonclinical paranoia, its experimental design and paranoia 
induction procedure limits the generalisability of its findings to ‘real life’ 
experiences. This limitation can be addressed by adopting more ecologically 
valid approaches, which allow prospective examination of the relationship 
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between rumination and paranoia in the context of daily life. Whilst this 
strategy has already been used in relation to clinical paranoia (e.g. Hartley et 
al., 2013), naturalistic investigation of the role of rumination in triggering and 
maintaining nonclinical paranoia over time is yet to be conducted.  
As discussed earlier, cognitive factors other than rumination such as self-
consciousness and mindfulness are also implicated in delusion formation and 
maintenance (Chadwick, 2006; Freeman et al., 2002). These theoretical 
accounts advocate a multifactorial explanation of paranoid delusions, such 
that different cognitive processes play a combined role in triggering and 
maintaining these distressing experiences (Freeman, 2007). Although 
increased understanding of these hypothesised mechanisms of influence can 
be achieved by focusing on the concurrent and prospective relationship 
between paranoia, rumination, self-consciousness and mindfulness, no study 
has addressed this issue to date.  
1.3.3. Mindfulness 
Mindfulness describes an inherent human capacity to be aware of one’s 
moment-to-moment experience non-judgementally and with acceptance 
(Keng, Smoski, & Robins, 2011). This natural/dispositional ability, although 
amenable to change via training, characterises both untrained and trained 
persons (Brown, Ryan, Loverich, Biegel, & West, 2011). Although overall 
consensus regarding the definition of mindfulness is yet to be attained (Keng 
et al., 2011), for the purposes of the current study, Kabat-Zinn’s (2003) 
definition was adopted - “the awareness that emerges through paying 
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attention on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgementally to the 
unfolding of experience moment by moment” (p. 145).  
Several measures have been employed depending on whether mindfulness is 
conceptualized as a single (e.g. Brown & Ryan, 2003) or multifaceted 
construct (e.g. Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006). To 
address this issue, Baer and colleagues (2006) developed the Five Facet 
Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ) after examining the facet structure of 
mindfulness. This self-report measure of dispositional mindfulness has 
become increasingly used in research (Williams, Dalgleish, Karl, & Kuyken, 
2014).  
According to Abba, Chadwick, and Stevenson (2008), mindfulness aims to 
change an individual’s response to their experience rather than changing the 
experience itself. This has important implications when considering evidence 
from clinical studies suggesting that it is not the psychotic symptoms per se 
(i.e. voices) which cause distress, but rather how one relates to this 
experience (Romme, Honig, Noorthoom, & Escher, 1992). Chadwick’s (2006) 
model illustrates mindful and non-mindful ways of responding to psychotic 
experiences. Non-mindful responses involve one’s tendency to either avoid or 
get lost in reacting to such experiences by engaging in rumination and/or 
confrontation (see section 1.3.2. above), experiential avoidance and negative 
judgement. Such reactions correspond to dysfunctional coping strategies 
characterizing psychotic individuals (e.g. Birchwood & Chadwick, 1997) and 
have also been implicated in the maintenance and increase of a range of 
psychopathology outcomes (e.g. Broderick, 2005; Campbell-Sills, Barlow, 
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Brown, & Hofmann, 2006; Sloan, 2004). In contrast, the model postulates that 
mindful responses to psychotic sensations, involve maintaining decentred 
awareness of these experiences, accepting them just as they are and not 
reacting to them. In this sense, decentred awareness is synonym of 
experiential acceptance, which is characterised by openness and non-
resistance to experiencing painful thoughts and emotions (Chadwick, 2006). 
In support of Chadwick’s (2006) model, evidence from intervention studies 
indicate the beneficial role of mindfulness in reducing the negative impact of 
psychosis-related symptoms (including paranoia) both in clinical (Chadwick, 
Hughes, Russell, Russell, & Dagnan, 2009; Khoury, Lecomte, Gaudiano, & 
Paquin, 2013) and nonclinical samples (Collip, Geschwind, Peeters, Myin-
Germeys, van Os, & Wichers, 2013a; Langer, Cangas & Gallego, 2010). 
Other than intervention studies, research has also found that non-judgemental 
acceptance of experience (i.e. a mindfulness-related construct) predicted less 
emotional resistance to and behavioural engagement with voices among 
individuals experiencing persistent auditory hallucinations (Morris, Garety, & 
Peters, 2014). Brett and colleagues (Brett, Heriot-Maitland, McGuire, & 
Peters, 2014) also found that lower distress to psychotic-like anomalous 
experiences was predicted by ‘neutral and accepting responses’ (as opposed 
to ‘controlling and reactive’ responding) in a sample combining clinical (i.e. 
diagnosed) and nonclinical (i.e. ‘at risk’ and ‘undiagnosed’) populations (Brett 
et al., 2014). A nonclinical study also examined mediating and moderating 
effects of negative schemas (i.e. negative view about oneself and others), 
mood (i.e. anxiety and depression), and psychological flexibility (i.e. a proxy 
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measure of mindfulness) on delusional ideation (Oliver et al., 2012a). Findings 
suggested the potential role of psychological flexibility in protecting individuals 
against delusional ideation in that the indirect effect of negative schemas 
upon delusions through anxiety was shown to be conditional on psychological 
flexibility. In other words, more psychologically flexible individuals are less 
likely to experience distressing delusions, even in the context of increased 
anxiety and negative thoughts about themselves and others (Oliver et al., 
2012a). 
Apart from intervention studies, the evidence presented above is cross-
sectional in nature and therefore does not allow causality inferences to be 
made. However, one prospective study has been carried out focusing on the 
predictive association between mindfulness and nonclinical delusions over 
time. The findings showed that mindfulness not only predicted less delusional 
ideation distress over a 6 month-period but also mediated the impact of 
negative schemas on subclinical delusions (Oliver, McLachlan, Jose, & Peters 
(2012b). In addition to Oliver et al.’s (2012b) study, research adopting 
naturalistic prospective designs to examine the hypothesised causal links 
between mindfulness-related processes and psychotic symptoms in both 
clinical and nonclinical samples is also starting to emerge. Findings from 
relevant naturalistic prospective studies include: an association between 
‘decentring abilities’ and less psychotic-related distress and disruption to 
functioning in the context of daily life (Peters, Lataster, Greenwood, Kuipers, 
Scott, Williams, et al., 2012); a temporal association between experiential 
acceptance and quality of life among psychotic individuals (Vilardaga, Hayes, 
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Atkins, Bresee, & Kambiz, 2013), and the increased likelihood that paranoid 
students engage in daily avoidant (as opposed to mindful) coping than a ‘non-
paranoid’ student group (Udachina et al., 2009). 
In summary, the evidence reviewed above suggests mindfulness ability may 
protect individuals against distressing paranoid thoughts, by helping the 
person to decenter from such thoughts, whereby these experiences are 
viewed objectively, and in an accepting and non-judgemental way. However, 
the contribution of mindfulness to emergent and/or persistent paranoid 
experiences when compared to other theoretically relevant cognitive 
processes (e.g. self-consciousness and rumination) remains unknown. 
Examining the temporal and dynamic relationship between paranoia, 
mindfulness and other cognitive processes will be particularly useful given 
that similarly to its clinical counterpart, subclinical paranoid beliefs negatively 
impact subjective wellbeing (Freeman et al., 2005; Freeman et al., 2011).  
1.3.4. Problem behaviours 
The term ‘problem behaviours’ refers to a range of behaviours that have been 
identified clinically and by research as problematic/maladaptive, commonly 
co-occurring, transdiagnostic and socially concerning (e.g. aggression, self-
harm and drug misuse; Kingston, Clarke, Ritchie, & Remington, 2011). 
Theoretical accounts highlight the functional similarity of diverse problem 
behaviours in that they may represent attempts at emotional regulation by 
temporarily reducing aversive internal states (Hayes et al., 1996). Similarly, 
influential models of delusion formation and maintenance conceptualise 
behavioural responses such as avoidance (e.g. diverting attention from painful 
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thoughts) and misusing substances as either ‘avoidant/safety’ behaviours 
(Freeman et al., 2007) or as part of a process of experiential avoidance 
(Chadwick, 2006) in that they constitute attempts at reducing the impact of 
threat beliefs by disconnecting from and/or changing the unpleasant 
delusional sensations. By engaging in these unhelpful behavioural responses, 
the person is prevented from obtaining evidence that disconfirms their threat 
beliefs (Freeman et al., 2007) and remains ‘stuck’ in a cycle of maladaptive 
coping which reinforces the distress caused by their persecutory ideas 
(Chadwick, 2006).  
Evidence supporting the above theoretical views and Chadwick’s (2006) 
model in particular, includes research showing an association between 
frequency of paranoid cognitions and “avoidant coping” in clinical and 
nonclinical populations (da Motta, Corvalho, Pinto-Gouveia, & Peixoto, 2014; 
Freeman et al., 2005), and the increased tendency in both groups to engage 
in covert attempts to manage unpleasant psychotic-related experiences by 
thinking/behaving negatively in reaction to such experiences (i.e. 
“punishment’-based coping strategies) and/or by replacing these experiences 
with other anxiety-provoking thoughts (i.e. “worry”-based coping strategies) 
(Morrison & Wells, 2000; Morrison, Wells and Northard, 2000; Taylor, Graves, 
& Stopa, 2009). 
Maladaptive coping with psychotic disorders and comorbid diagnoses in the 
form of clinically relevant problem behaviours, is also supported by cross-
cultural evidence identifying these as key correlates (both cross-sectionally 
and prospectively) of such disorders (e.g. Gureje, Olowosegun, Adebayo, & 
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Stein, 2010; Kelleher & Cannon, 2010; Murphy & Brewer, 2011; Scott, Martin, 
Welham, Bor, Najman, O’Callaghan, et al., 2009; Sharifi, Bakhshaie, Hatmi, 
Faghih-Nasiri, Sadeghianmehr, Mirkia, et al., 2012). Among these different 
types of maladaptive behaviours, those often reported include: substance 
misuse (e.g. alcohol, cigarette and cannabis use), self-harming and/or suicidal 
behaviour, aggression, and engagement in ‘dangerous activities’ (Freeman, 
Garety, & Kuipers, 2001; Harris, Oakley, & Picchioni, 2014; MacKie, 
Castellanos-Ryan, & Conrod, 2011; Melo & Bentall, 2010). In addition to this 
evidence, other empirical work has also provided compelling evidence of a 
relationship between discrete problem behaviours and psychotic-related 
experiences (including but not specific to paranoia) at the clinical (e.g. 
Compton, Kelley, Ramsay, Pringle, Goulding, Esterberger, et al., 2009; 
Douglas, Guy, & Hart, 2009), and nonclinical (e.g. Fanning, Berman, Mohn, & 
McCloskey, 2011; Rossler, Hengartner, Angst, & Ajdacic-Gross, 2011) ends 
of the spectrum.  
Of research specifically focusing on paranoia, evidence showing its 
association with specific problem behaviours, such as substance misuse and 
aggression in clinical and nonclinical populations, has led authors to suggest 
that behavioural dysregulation is a cardinal feature of emotional regulation 
deficits underlying paranoia across the continuum of severity (Lincoln et al., 
2010; Lincoln et al., 2014). However, studies are yet to systematically 
examine the behavioural correlates of nonclinical paranoia (Lincoln et al., 
2010; Simpson et al., 2012). Furthermore, existing studies have mostly 
focused on discrete problem behaviours, therefore failing to recognize the 
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comorbidity often characterizing such behaviours, whereby presence of 
behavioural dysregulation in one area is usually accompanied by behavioural 
difficulties in another area (Wupperman, Marlatt, Cunningham, Bowen, 
Berking, Mulvihill-Rivera, et al., 2012). Studies should therefore, move away 
from the overall emphasis consistently placed on a narrow range of discrete 
problem behaviours (e.g. either substance misuse or aggression) indexing 
key behavioural dysfunction linked to paranoia, as such approach excludes 
other emotional dysregulation-driven behaviours (e.g. self-harm and binge 
eating) (Kingston et al., 2011), which may also characterise and/or co-occur 
alongside paranoia experiences. One way of addressing this issue is for 
research in this area to focus on examining the association between paranoia 
and behavioural dysregulation in the form of a wider range of co-
occurring/comorbid problem behaviours (i.e. using composite measures of 
this construct).  
As per the recommendations above, a secondary aim of this study is therefore 
to investigate the relationship between nonclinical paranoia and a 
global/composite measure of problem behaviours. Pursuing this line of inquiry 
has both theoretical value and potentially useful practical/clinical application. 
Conceptually, the relationship between nonclinical paranoia and diverse 
maladaptive behaviours can potentially help strengthen/refine existing 
theory/models identifying common processes (e.g. experiential avoidance; 
emotional regulation deficits) underlying these phenomena. In terms of 
practical application, identifying clinically-relevant problem behaviours as a 
comorbid feature of paranoia has the potential to help guide standard practice 
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at all stages of clinical work (i.e. assessment, formulation and intervention) 
and may also contribute towards the development and/or implementation of 
tailored interventions specifically designed to target such comorbidity. 
1.4. Methodological considerations 
1.4.1. Correlational vs. longitudinal designs 
In the previous section, a review of the literature concerning cognitive and 
behavioural processes, which are theoretically relevant to paranoia, was 
presented. The studies reviewed are part of a larger body of evidence 
showing similarities in correlates and predictors of paranoia across the 
continuum of severity (e.g. Freeman et al., 2005; Freeman et al., 2011; 
Bebbington et al., 2013). Notwithstanding the value of this research in 
clarifying commonalities between clinical and nonclinical paranoia, its 
predominant reliance on cross-sectional designs, limits the ability for causal 
inferences to be made about the potential role of a range of factors in 
contributing to delusion formation and maintenance (Freeman et al., 2011). 
Consequently, there has been a methodological shift within this area of 
research to designs that allow tentative conclusions about causal 
relationships to be made (e.g. longitudinal, experimental).  
Prospective studies have used ecologically valid methods to examine the 
temporal relationship between paranoia and cognitive and affective processes 
implicated in its development and maintenance. In one study the Experience 
Sampling Method (ESM) was used with 158 participants with clinical and 
subclinical levels of paranoia, to examine the prediction of paranoid episodes 
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from momentary levels of emotional experiences and self-esteem occurring in 
the course of 1 week. The findings indicated that onset of paranoid episodes 
was preceded by both a decrease in self-esteem and an increase in anxiety 
(Thewissen, Bentall, Oorschot, a Campo, van Lierop, van Os, et al., 2011). 
ESM was also used to investigate the prediction of subclinical psychotic 
experiences from momentary assessments of stress reactivity over a period of 
14 months. Results showed that persistent psychotic experiences were 
preceded by higher levels of emotional and daily stress reactivity, leading the 
authors to conclude that higher vulnerability to psychosis may result from 
higher stress sensitivity and more dysfunctional coping (Collip, Wigman, Myin-
Germeys, Jacobs, Derom, Thiery, et al., 2013b).  
Collectively, naturalistic prospective studies such as those described above, 
have been valuable in advancing current knowledge on the psychological 
mechanisms underlying the maintenance of paranoid beliefs in the context of 
daily life. In clinical samples, greater emphasis has been placed on contextual 
factors associated with affective variables and psychosis (Myin-Germeys, 
Delespaul, & van Os, 2005; Vilardaga et al., 2013), whereas nonclinical 
research has mainly focused on the association between natural variation in 
paranoia and temporal variability in a range of cognitive-affective factors such 
as negative affect (Kramer, Simons, Wigman, Collip, Jacobs, Derom, et al., 
2013), self-esteem (Thewissen et al., 2011) and experiential avoidance 
(Udachina et al., 2009).  
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Overall, evidence from the studies above suggests that variability in cognitive-
affective factors over time predicts subsequent occurrence of paranoid 
thinking, with higher variability indexing increased psychological 
maladjustment and lower variability indexing greater psychological wellbeing. 
This is consistent with findings from a recent meta-analytic review (Houben, 
van den Noortgate, & Kuppens, 2015) and research focusing on the dynamic 
relationship between psychotic-related symptoms and negative emotional 
processes in both clinical (e.g. Peters et al., 2012; Myin-Germeys, Peeters, 
Havermans, Nicolson, deVries, Delespaul, et al., 2003; Myin-Germeys et al., 
2005; Collip, Myin-Germeys, & van Os, 2008), and nonclinical samples (e.g. 
Husky, Grondin, & Swendsen, 2004; Kramer et al., 2013; Thewissen et al., 
2011). 
Notwithstanding the value of the above research, the study of nonclinical 
paranoia from a dynamic perspective is yet to consider its temporal 
relationship with other theoretically relevant cognitive factors, such as those 
identified in the current study. Equally, the hypothesis that these cognitive 
processes (both at trait and state levels) may also contribute to further 
occurrence of paranoid thinking is yet to be examined. Furthermore, whilst 
most research in this area has prioritised the prediction of paranoid beliefs 
from momentary fluctuations in cognitive or affective variables of interest (e.g. 
Kramer et al., 2013; Thewissen et al., 2011), the extent to which these 
cognitive/affective processes may also be influenced by pre-morbid or trait 
paranoia is less well understood.  
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Besides the methodological considerations presented above, another 
challenging issue in paranoia research concerns the type of measures used to 
assess this construct; this is discussed next.  
 
1.4.2. Pre-defined questionnaire measures vs. personal accounts 
The measurement of paranoia using self-report questionnaire-based methods 
is prevalent in this area of research (Ellett, Allen-Crooks, Stevens, Wildschut, 
& Chadwick, 2013; Freeman, Pugh, Antley, Slater, Bebbington, Gittins, et al., 
2008b). Of the range of available measures validated for use with nonclinical 
populations, the most widely used is the Paranoia Scale (PS; Fenigstein & 
Vanable, 1992). The PS is unidimensional in that it assesses presence or 
absence of persecutory ideas, and employs a broad definition of paranoia, 
including cognitions related to, although not specific to paranoia (e.g. 
depressive thoughts, ideas of reference) (Freeman & Garety, 2000). Unlike 
the PS, multidimensional self-report measures of paranoia such as the 
Paranoia Checklist (PC; Freeman et al., 2005) go beyond noting the 
presence/absence of paranoid thinking by also covering its content. The PC 
(Freeman et al., 2005) also assesses the frequency of paranoid thoughts as 
well as the related degree of conviction and distress.  
Notwithstanding their contribution to advancing research on prevalence, 
content and concomitants of paranoia, most questionnaire-based methods 
adopt a pre-defined approach to measuring this construct. Such an approach 
does not take into account the phenomenological view, which emphasises 
subjective, idiosyncratic, personal experiences of paranoia along key 
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dimensions (Ellett et al., 2003). To address this issue, Ellett et al. (2003) 
developed the Personal Experience of Paranoia Scale (PEPS), a novel 
questionnaire-based measure which assesses the content of paranoid beliefs 
as well as cognitive, affective and behavioural components of paranoia, based 
on personal accounts of individual paranoia experiences (Ellett et al., 2003). 
In their cross-sectional study examining the phenomenology of paranoia 
experiences in a student sample, Ellett et al. (2003) found that paranoia was 
characterised by perceptions of powerlessness, feelings of anger, frustration 
and of being negatively judged by others, and engagement in avoidant-type 
behaviour. These findings are consistent with research employing alternative 
methodologies (e.g. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis and semi-
structured interviews) showing the content diversity and similarity of 
personalised accounts of paranoia experiences in both clinical and nonclinical 
groups (Campbell & Morrison, 2007). Nevertheless, and despite increased 
recognition of the idiosyncratic and multifaceted nature of paranoia along the 
continuum of severity, the use of methodologies that capture personal 
accounts of paranoid experiences such as the PEPS (Ellett et al., 2003) 
remains limited (Campbell & Morrison, 2007; Stopa et al., 2013). 
Besides Ellett et al.’s (2003) investigation, to date the PEPS has only featured 
in two other studies, namely: da Motta et al. (2014) and Allen-Crooks and 
Ellett (2014). Whereas in da Motta et al.’s study, the PEPS was used to 
determine differences in emotional, cognitive and behavioural reactions to 
paranoid symptoms when comparing clinical and nonclinical populations, in 
the second study this measure was used to examine qualitative descriptions 
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of reasons for change in belief dimensions over time. However, studies are 
yet to examine what factors may prospectively explain or influence occurrence 
of paranoid experiences when focusing on personally defined accounts and in 
the context of daily life. Furthermore, the extent to which idiosyncratic 
paranoid experiences may be influenced by a range of theoretically relevant 
cognitive processes such as those identified in this study is currently 
unknown. 
1.5. The current study  
1.5.1. Summary of research gaps & key methodological issues 
As discussed in the previous literature review, a number of research gaps and 
methodological issues have been identified, which are relevant to the aims of 
the current study.  
First, although public self-consciousness, rumination and mindfulness have 
been directly implicated in the formation and maintenance of paranoid 
cognitions (Chadwick, 2006; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992; Freeman et al., 
2007), evidence of the relationship between these variables and nonclinical 
paranoia varies depending on which of these cognitive processes is prioritised 
by research. Whilst several studies have found an association between public 
self-consciousness and paranoia (e.g. Bodner & Mikulincer; 1998; Fenigstein 
& Vanable, 1992; Martin & Penn, 2001; von Gemmingen et al., 2003), 
research focusing on the association between paranoia, rumination and 
mindfulness is less well established (Oliver et al., 2012b; Simpson et al., 
2012). Furthermore, often these cognitive processes are studied in isolation 
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rather than together using cross-sectional designs, which precludes more 
theoretical integration in this line of research as well as the ability to identify 
their relative contribution to the prediction of paranoia over time (Freeman et 
al., 2007).  
Second, although clinically-relevant problem behaviours have been identified 
as key correlates of psychotic-related disorders (e.g. Kelleher & Cannon, 
2010) and theoretically implicated in the emergence and maintenance of 
persecutory delusions (e.g. Chadwick, 2006), research is yet to systematically 
investigate the behavioural correlates of nonclinical paranoia (Lincoln et al., 
2014; Simpson et al., 2012).  
Third, the predominance of cross-sectional designs in this area of research 
only allows assessment of the presence of key psychological processes 
relevant to paranoia but not the extent to which they may influence paranoid 
thinking; therefore, prospective/longitudinal designs are currently needed to 
address this limitation (Freeman et al., 2012). Naturalistic prospective studies 
constitute a promising approach to examine the dynamic nature of the 
mechanisms of influence by which these psychological processes may 
operate to trigger and maintain paranoia. However, to date this research has 
mostly focused on the dynamic relationship between paranoia and specific 
cognitive and affective processes (e.g. self-esteem and negative affect) at the 
exclusion of other theoretically relevant variables. Furthermore, the dynamic 
and naturalistic approach to the study of paranoia and its putative correlates, 
is yet to consider the association between these processes both at a 
time/context-dependent level (i.e. state variables) and a static/pre-morbid 
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level (i.e. trait measures) (Kesting & Lincoln, 2013; Ellett, Owens & Berry, 
2015).  
 
Fourth, the overall reliance on pre-defined/standard approaches to measuring 
paranoia to date limits the ability to capture its idiosyncratic, interpersonal and 
multifaceted nature (Allen-Crooks & Ellett, 2014). To address this issue, 
personal account-based measures of paranoia experiences such as the 
PEPS (Ellett et al., 2003) have been developed and shown to effectively 
examine the phenomenology of paranoia in nonclinical samples both cross-
sectionally and prospectively (Allen-Crooks & Ellett, 2014; Ellett et al., 2003). 
However, the extent to which idiosyncratic paranoia experiences may be 
prospectively influenced by a range of theoretically relevant cognitive 
processes is currently unknown. 
 
1.5.2. Study aims & hypotheses 
In order to address the above-mentioned research gaps and methodological 
issues, the current study had three main aims. Each aim will be presented 
below and linked to the respective study hypothesis(es).  
The first aim of the study is to a) extend research on correlates of nonclinical 
paranoia, by examining its association with three theoretically relevant 
cognitive factors (i.e. public self-consciousness, rumination, and mindfulness) 
previously implicated in the formation and maintenance of paranoid 
cognitions, and b) contribute towards the study of behavioural facets of 
nonclinical paranoia by investigating its association with a global measure of 
problem behaviour. 
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Specifically, it was predicted that: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): at baseline, trait paranoia will be associated with trait 
measures of public self-consciousness and rumination (positive correlation), 
mindfulness (negative correlation), and with a global measure of problem 
behaviour (positive correlation).  
 
The second aim of the study is to examine the temporal and dynamic 
relationship between paranoia and the three cognitive factors, by investigating 
the concurrent and predictive association between these variables over a 
period of 2 weeks. Specifically, it was predicted that: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): state paranoia, public self-awareness, rumination and 
mindfulness taken at three random time points over the 2-week period will 
correlate; and 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): trait paranoia will predict variability in state measures of 
paranoia, public self-consciousness, rumination and mindfulness. 
 
The third aim of the study is to extend paranoia prospective and naturalistic 
research by investigating the prediction of individual experiences of paranoia, 
as measured by the PEPS (Ellett et al., 2003) from pre-defined/standard trait 
and state measures of paranoia and the three cognitive factors.  
Specifically, it was predicted that: 
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Hypothesis 4 (H4): trait paranoia, public self-consciousness, rumination 
(positive correlation) and mindfulness (negative correlation) at baseline will 
predict paranoia experiences as measured by the PEPS after 2 weeks, and 
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): state paranoia, public self-awareness, rumination, and 
state mindfulness will predict paranoia experiences as measured by the PEPS 
after 2 weeks.
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METHOD 
2.1. Design 
The study’s design included a cross-sectional, correlational and a prospective 
component.   
2.1.1. Cross-sectional component 
A within-subjects cross-sectional design was used to examine the association 
between trait paranoia, at baseline and five other baseline measures i.e. trait 
public self-consciousness, trait rumination, trait mindfulness, and a composite 
measure of problem behaviour at baseline (H1).  
2.1.2. Correlational component 
A within-subjects correlational design was also used to examine the 
association between state measures of paranoia, public self-awareness, 
rumination and mindfulness over the 2 weeks immediately after the 
completion of baseline measures (H2). This involved obtaining three random 
samples of the four state measures during the 2-week period, and the total 
scores were then averaged and correlated. 
2.1.3. Prospective component 
The study also used a within-subjects prospective design, which includes 
three different components linked to different hypotheses. The first component 
consisted of using trait paranoia at baseline to predict variability in state 
measures over the 2-week period (H3); the second component involved using 
baseline trait measures to predict individual experiences of paranoia over the 
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2-week period (H4), and the third component consisted of using state 
measures to predict individual experiences of paranoia over the 2 weeks (H5). 
As shown in Figure 1 below, the study involved three different stages of data 
collection and each stage is intrinsically linked to a specific aspect of the 
study’s design and to specific hypotheses as highlighted above. In stage 1, 
baseline measures were completed; this was then followed by completion of 
state measures taken at three random time points over 2 weeks (stage 2), 
and at the end of the 2-week period, a follow-up measure (i.e. PEPS) was 
also completed (stage 3).  
Figure 1 – Flow chart depicting three stages of data collection  
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 56
2.2. Sample  
The study used an opportunity sample of N = 86 undergraduate and 
postgraduate Royal Holloway University of London (RHUL) students. 
Seventy-two (83.7%) participants were female and the mean age of the 
sample was 20.71 years (SD = 4.8, range = 18-42 years). Additional 
demographic information is presented in the Results section below (p. 75).   
2.3. Power Analysis 
A priori power analyses were computed to estimate the sample size for the 
cross-sectional and prospective aspects of the study.  
2.3.1. Cross-sectional power analysis 
The sample size for H1 was estimated for analyses using the Pearson 
correlation (r) coefficient. Existing research showed medium to large 
correlations (range .34-.54) for mindfulness and subclinical delusional ideation 
(Oliver et al., 2012b), rumination and nonclinical paranoia (Martinelli et al., 
2013), and self-consciousness and nonclinical paranoia (Fenigstein & 
Vanable, 1992). Therefore, with power at .80, alpha of 0.05 (1-tailed test), and 
predicting a medium effect size using a correlational design (i.e. Cohen’s d = 
.30), a sample size of 70 participants was required to examine the cross-
sectional association between the study variables. 
 
 
 
 57
2.3.2. Prospective power analysis 
The effect size used to calculate the sample size for the prospective 
component of the study was the Regression () coefficient, which represents 
a) the contribution of trait paranoia to the prediction of variability in state 
measures over 2 weeks (H3), and b) the prediction of paranoid experiences at 
follow-up (i.e. end of 2-week period) from baseline (H4) and state (H5) 
measures. Relevant studies showed regression coefficients ranging between 
20-.43 for the prediction of a) subclinical delusional ideation from mindfulness 
over 6 months (Oliver et al., 2012b), b) persecutory delusions from rumination 
over 6 days (Hartley et al., 2013), and c) subclinical psychosis-related 
symptoms from premorbid psychosis vulnerability over 7 days (Verdoux, 
Gindre, Sorbara, Tournier, & Swendsen, 2003a).  
Therefore, with power at .80, alpha of 0.05, and predicting a medium effect 
size using multiple regression analysis (Cohen’s d = .15), with 4 independent 
variables (i.e. trait paranoia, self-consciousness, rumination and mindfulness 
at baseline), a sample of 84 participants was required to examine the 
prediction of paranoid experiences at follow-up (see Fig. 1 above).   
Therefore, a sample size of at least 84 participants was required to ensure 
there was enough power to detect a significant effect both cross-sectionally 
and prospectively. 
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2.4. Recruitment 
A number of strategies were used to recruit RHUL students to the study: the 
Psychology Experiment Management System (PEMS), advertisements on the 
RHUL main website’s notice board, and by sending an email notifying all 
RHUL academic departments about the study.  
Along with other ongoing research studies, the current project was advertised 
to first year psychology undergraduate students via the PEMS. The advert 
summarised the study, including details regarding the three stages of data 
collection (see Fig. 1 above) and respective procedures (see section 2.6.2. 
below).  The ‘message of the day’ scheme which uses the RHUL intranet 
system and the circulation of emails advertising the study to all academic 
departments facilitated the recruitment of undergraduate and postgraduate 
students from courses other than psychology. The project was advertised as a 
voluntary study investigating ‘thoughts, feelings and experiences’ over a 2-
week period, and provided an email address for interested students to contact 
the researcher (appendix 1). Undergraduate psychology students received 
course credits for taking part and all other participants were entered into a 
prize draw for Amazon vouchers.  
2.5. Measures 
A total of 11 measures were used in the study and these can be found in 
appendices 2-4. A summary description of each of the measures used is 
presented below. 
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2.5.1. Socio-demographic questionnaire  
A short questionnaire was devised to gather socio-demographic information 
including the participants’ age, gender, ethnicity, and course details. Other 
aspects included: whether they had previous knowledge/experience of 
mindfulness, and whether they had ever been diagnosed with a mental health 
problem. The latter information helped ensure the study assessed nonclinical 
paranoia and that previous mindfulness knowledge/practice would not have a 
confounding effect on findings (i.e. ensuring measurement of dispositional 
mindful abilities among a non-meditating sample). 
2.5.2. Baseline Measures 
The Paranoia Scale (PS; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) is a 20-item measure 
of nonclinical paranoia, including beliefs that others or external sources are 
trying to influence one’s behaviour or thinking, and of a conspiracy against 
oneself or of being spied on; suspiciousness, and resentment. The PS items 
are rated on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all applicable to me, 5 = extremely 
applicable to me) and the measure ranges from 20 to 100, with higher scores 
indicating higher levels of subclinical paranoia. The PS has shown good 
internal consistency ( = .84) and has demonstrated adequate test-retest 
reliability (r = .70) (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). In this sample, the PS had 
good internal consistency ( = .89).  
The Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS; Fenigstein et al., 1975) is a 23-item 
measure of public self-consciousness (i.e. attentiveness to aspects of the self, 
which are presented to others, such as physical appearance) and private self-
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consciousness (i.e. attentiveness to internal aspects of the self, such as 
negative feelings). The public self-consciousness subscale consists of 7 items 
and the private self-consciousness subscale consists of 16 items. Each item 
of the SCS is scored on a 5-point scale (0 = extremely uncharacteristic, 4 = 
extremely characteristic). The SCS ranges from 0 to 92 (i.e. ranges from 0-35 
and from 0-64 for public and private self-consciousness, respectively), with 
higher scores indicating higher levels of self-consciousness. In nonclinical 
samples, the SCS has shown relatively good reliability, as well as discriminate 
and convergent validity (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Govern & Marsch, 2001). In 
this sample, the SCS showed good internal consistency ( = 0.78).  
The Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ; Ehring, Zetsche, 
Weidacker, Wahl, Schonfeld, & Ehlers, 2011) is a 15-item measure of 
repetitive negative thinking. Items are rated on a 5-point scale (0 = never, 4 = 
almost always) and the measure ranges from 0 to 60, with higher scores 
indicating higher levels of trait rumination. In nonclinical samples, the PTQ 
has shown good internal consistency ( = 0.95), adequate test-retest reliability 
(r = 0.69), and good construct validity, positively correlating with measures of 
depressive rumination (r = 0.72) and worry (r = 0.70) (Martinelli et al., 2013). 
In this sample, the PTQ showed good internal consistency ( = 0.93). 
The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ, Baer et al., 2006) is a 
39-item measure of five mindfulness skills: ‘describing’ (i.e. ability to label 
one’s emotions/thoughts), ‘non-reactivity’ (i.e. to experience and let 
thoughts/feelings pass), ‘acting with awareness’ (i.e. attend to one’s actions in 
the moment), ‘non-judging’ (i.e. have noncritical reaction to one’s 
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thoughts/feeling), and ‘observing’ (i.e. attend to external environment, thought 
processes and emotional states) (Baer et al., 2006). The FFMQ items are 
rated on a 5-point scale (1 = never or very rarely true, 5 = very often or always 
true), and scores for all five facets are combined to yield a total score, which 
reflects a global measure of dispositional mindfulness. When validated in a 
nonclinical sample, the FFMQ initially showed adequate reliability, validity and 
consistency (alphas between 0.75-0.91). However, a separate community 
sample study showed the Observer factor did not load significantly on to an 
overarching mindfulness factor (Williams et al., 2014). Thus, exclusion of the 
Observer factor, when using nonclinical samples, ensures the FFMQ is 
structurally acceptable. Consequently, only the other four mindfulness facets 
(as specified above) were used in this study. This 31-item four-factor version 
of the FFMQ (range from 31 to 155) showed good internal consistency in this 
sample ( = .90).     
The Composite Measure of Problem Behavior (CMPB; Kingston et al., 
2011) is a 46-item measure of eight problem behaviours (e.g. self-harm, 
sexual promiscuity, excessive exercise, and aggression). Items are rated on a 
6-point scale (1 = very unlike me, 6 = very like me) and the measure ranges 
from 46-276, with higher scores indicating higher predisposition to engage in 
a range of problem behaviours. In a UK student sample, the measure showed 
good internal consistency (range  = .73 to .91), good construct validity, with 
each of its subscales correlating with corresponding validated measures as 
expected (r’s ranging from .50-.83), and good test-retest reliability (e.g. for a 
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2-week period, range r’s = .73-.98) (Kingston et al., 2010). In this sample, the 
CMPB showed good internal consistency ( = 0.82). 
2.5.3. State Measures 
The Paranoia and Depression Scale (PDS; Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998) is 
a 17-item measure of paranoid (7 items) and depressive (10 items) states of 
mind, which was derived from validated measures of paranoid and depressive 
psychopathology. Items are rated on a 6-point scale (1 = not at all, 6 = very 
often) and the measure ranges from 17 to 102 (i.e. ranges from 7 to 42 and 
from 10-60 for paranoid and depressive states, respectively), with higher 
scores indicating higher levels of state paranoia and depression. In a 
nonclinical sample of undergraduate students, the PDS showed good internal 
consistency (paranoia -  = 0.79; depression -  = 0.87), as well as 
discriminate and convergent validity (Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998).  In this 
sample, the PDS showed good internal consistency ( = 0.81). 
The Situational Self-Awareness Scale (SSAS; Govern & Marsch, 2001) 
assesses naturally occurring fluctuations in self-awareness states and 
includes three subscales: Public Self-Awareness (3 items), Private Self-
Awareness (3 items) and Awareness of Immediate Surroundings (3 items). All 
items are rated on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), 
and the measure ranges from 9 to 63 (i.e. ranges from 3 to 21 for each of the 
three subscales above). Responses are based on how one feels right now, at 
this instant, and higher scores indicate higher levels of self-awareness states. 
In a nonclinical sample of undergraduate students, the SSAS was shown to 
be internally consistent (Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .70-.82) (Govern & 
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Marsch, 2001). The SSAS was also found to be sensitive to fluctuations in 
situational self-awareness occurring within individuals over time and across 
situations (Govern & Marsch, 2001). In this sample, the SSAS showed good 
internal consistency ( = 0.74).  
The Ruminative Styles Questionnaire – state version (RSQ-s; Ciesla, 
Reilly, Dickson, Emanuel & Updegraff, 2012) is a 12-item scale assessing 
daily rumination. The items cover three dimensions of rumination: depressive 
rumination, reflective pondering, and brooding (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003) and ratings are given on 4-point scale (0 = not at all, 3 = all 
the time). The RSQ-s ranges from 0-36, with higher scores indicating higher 
levels of ruminative states. The RSQ-s is internally consistent (Cronbach’s 
alpha ranging from .91-.94) and has been used in naturalistic studies 
examining the temporal relationship between daily rumination and other 
cognitive and behavioural variables. For example, in Ciesla et al.’s (2012) 
study, increased levels of state rumination over a 7-day period (as assessed 
by the RSQ-s) was significantly associated with less dispositional mindfulness 
in a sample of 78 adolescents. In this study, state rumination also mediated 
the effects of the interaction between stress and mindfulness (Ciesla et al., 
2012). In this sample, the RSQ-s showed good internal consistency ( = 
0.92). 
The Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory – 14-item short version (FMI-14; 
Walach, Buchheld, Buttenmuller, Kleinknecht, & Schmidt, 2006) 
assesses trait and state-like components of mindfulness, depending on the 
timeframe specified by researchers. In the current study, the timeframe 
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chosen to assess state Mindfulness using the FMI-14 was the last 2 days. To 
the author’s knowledge, the latter is the shortest timeframe used to assess 
state Mindfulness to date (i.e. Buchheld, Grossman, & Walach, 2001). The 
FMI-14 items are rated on a 4-point scale (1 = rarely, 4 = almost always), with 
higher scores indicating higher state levels of mindfulness. The FMI-14 has 
shown to be semantically independent from a Buddhist or meditation context, 
and the measure is recommended for use with clinical and nonclinical 
samples without previous meditation experience (Walach et al., 2006). The 
FMI-14 has shown good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .86) and 
has been validated in both German and English speaking populations 
(Heidenreich, Ströhle, & Michalak, 2006; Leigh, Bowen, & Marlatt, 2005). In 
the current study, all the items of the FMI-14 were used except item 13 (i.e. ‘I 
am impatient with myself and with others’), as per Sauer, Ziegler, Danay, Ives, 
and Kohls’ (2012) recommendations. In the latter study, a Rasch model 
analysis of the FMI-14’s psychometric properties concluded that item13 
threatens the validity of the whole scale. The authors also confirmed that only 
the resulting 13-item version of the scale (FMI-13) showed acceptable 
approximation to Rasch requirements, whereas the FMI-14 did not (Sauer et 
al., 2012). Therefore, only the 13-item version of this scale (range from 13-52) 
was used in the current study. In this sample, the 13-item version of the FMI 
showed good internal consistency ( = 0.85). 
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2.5.4. Follow-up measure 
The Personal Experiences of Paranoia Scale (PEPS; Ellett et al., 2003) is 
a 15-item measure aiming to obtain a phenomenological and multidimensional 
description of paranoid experiences, including cognitive, behavioural and 
affective aspects of the experience. The PEPS is divided into two main parts – 
in part I, a paranoia experience is defined according to Freeman and Garety’s 
(2000) criteria (i.e. perceived intentional harm by others). This is followed by 
examples and by an item asking respondents to answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to 
whether they have had this type of experience. In part II, respondents are 
asked to describe the cognitive, affective and behavioural dimensions of such 
experience. The cognitive dimension consists of items of the extent to which 
an individual feels: a) judged negatively by others, b) blocked from achieving 
his/her goals, c) powerless to stop what has been done to him/her, d) 
preoccupied with the event, e) the experience has had an impact of on his/her 
wellbeing, f) his/her mistreatment by others was deserved, and g) that 
currently, there has been a change in his/her beliefs. Items a) to f) are rated 
on a 5-point scale, with ratings ranging from: ‘1 = not at all’ to ‘5 = very much’ 
for the first four items; ‘1 = not at all’ to ‘5 = severe’ for the fifth item, and ‘1 = 
totally undeserved to 5 = totally deserved’ for the sixth item. As for item g), 
this only requires a ‘yes/no’ answer. The behavioural dimension of the PEPS 
refers to the preferred courses of action in response to the experience and the 
actual actions taken, whereas the affective dimension of this measure taps 
into the emotions experienced at the time. In a student sample (N = 324), 47% 
reported a paranoia experience using the PEPS. In this group, scores on the 
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Paranoia Scale (PS) were significantly higher than among individuals who 
reported no experiences of paranoia, and greater levels of paranoia were 
associated with lower self-esteem (Ellett et al., 2003). In the current study, the 
PEPS was used to examine whether trait and state measures of paranoia and 
the three cognitive factors predicted endorsement of personal paranoia 
experiences at the end of the 2-week period (i.e. H4 and H5). Therefore, for 
the purposes of hypothesis testing, only the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ answers to the 
PEPS (i.e. part I, as explained above) were included as the DV in this study. 
Regarding the multidimensional components of paranoia experiences (i.e. 
part II), a brief overview of the participants’ responses to the cognitive aspects 
of such experiences was also provided in the form of a descriptive analysis as 
shown in the Results section (i.e. p. 77 below). 
2.6. Procedure 
2.6.1. Piloting  
The piloting phase of the study involved creating online versions of all 
questionnaires (i.e. baseline, state and follow-up measures) using the RHUL 
Psychology Online Survey system. Ten individuals, known to the researcher, 
were approached to complete the study measures, over a two week period, 
and provide feedback on the content (e.g. items clarity), technical issues (e.g. 
effectiveness of online system) and the time spent completing each set of 
measures. Five individuals took part and their feedback helped confirm the 
content of the questionnaires was deemed clear and understandable for 
research purposes and the online system was quick and easy to use. 
Information regarding questionnaires’ completion times (i.e. 20-30mins for 
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baseline measures, 5mins for state measures, and 10-15mins for the PEPS) 
also helped refining the study’s procedures. 
2.6.2. Data collection procedures  
The study involved three stages of data collection (Fig. 1 above). To ensure 
researcher effects were minimised for all stages of the study, procedures 
across participants were standardised by following scripted instructions 
(appendices 5 and 6). 
At baseline, participants met with the researcher, who described the study 
(appendix 7), answered questions, and obtained written consent (appendix 8). 
As part of consent, participants were asked to opt in to receiving an email 
prompting them to complete stage 2 of the study. Consenting participants 
then completed baseline questionnaires, online, without the researcher 
present. Following this, participants were given three questionnaire packs, 
each containing a set of state measures. Each participant was made aware 
they would need to complete these packs during the subsequent two weeks, 
and would be instructed about when to do this by email. A date and time for 
the final point of data collection (i.e. completion of the PEPS) was then 
arranged before the participant left. Participants were also required to return 
all three completed questionnaire packs to the researcher when they met 
again for stage 3 of the study. 
Completion of stage 2 involved sending each participant an email at three 
random times during the 2-week period reminding them to complete one 
questionnaire pack per time point. Participants were given a 3-hour window 
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after receiving the initial email prompt, within which to complete each pack. 
The 2-week period to collect state measures is consistent with the timeframes 
used in similar naturalistic prospective studies, whereby periods of 1-2 weeks 
have usually been reported (e.g. Scollon, Kim-Prieto, & Diener, 2003; 
Thewissen et al., 2011). 
To complete stage 3, all consenting participants met with the researcher again 
at the date/time and location agreed at the initial meeting, 2 weeks earlier. 
Initially, the researcher collected the three completed questionnaire packs 
from the participant and subsequently asked him/her to complete the follow-
up questionnaire (i.e. PEPS) online, without the researcher present. The 
researcher then joined the participant again and answered any outstanding 
questions before fully debriefing him/her about the study (appendix 9).  
Throughout all stages of the study, anonymity was ensured by allocating a 
unique research ID number to each participant. The participants’ initials and 
research ID numbers were linked using a password protected Excel 
document, which was regularly updated. Only the researcher and her 
supervisors could access this document or any of the participants’ data. 
Furthermore, only when debriefed after completing stage 3 of the study, were 
participants made aware of the purpose or details regarding the measures 
they were asked to complete. 
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2.7. Randomisation 
For stage 2 of the study, the days and times for completing state measures 
were randomised across participants. This strategy ensured expectancy 
effects were minimised (i.e. completion of questionnaires at random times 
ensured data collected corresponded to participant’s ‘spontaneous’/naturally 
occurring behaviour rather than potentially modified behaviour if they already 
knew when to complete the measures).  An online website 
(www.randomization.com) was used to randomise three blocks of 5 days each 
(i.e. block 1 corresponding to days 1-5, block 2 to days 6-10 and block 3 to 
days 11-15) across all 86 participants, as well as three time points per day 
(morning, afternoon and evening periods of the day i.e. 10am, 2pm and 6pm). 
This resulted in three random time points, for each participant, across the two-
week period. At these times, the participant was contacted by email and 
asked to complete the corresponding set of state measures. This meant that 
participants could be sent email prompts at any day during the 2-week period, 
including weekends and all were made aware of this prior to consenting to the 
study. Similar time periods for prompts to be sent on a daily basis have been 
reported in other relevant naturalistic prospective studies (e.g. Verdoux, et al., 
2003a). 
Email prompts were sent to each participant using the researchers’ University 
email address. All email prompts were drafted in advance and they all 
contained the same message, as well as specifying which questionnaire pack 
needed completing at each time point. 
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To control for order effects, the same website above was used to randomly 
select three different ordering sequences of the state measures contained in 
each questionnaire pack. All 86 participants were randomised to three 
sequences (termed A, B and C) in which to present the state measures in 
packs 1-3. When going through the randomisation results, the researcher 
ensured that each participant would be allocated the three different 
sequences so avoiding any repetition of the same sequence across packs 1-
3. These three sequences were chosen arbitrarily and each consisted of the 
following order: 
Sequence A = FMI-13; PDS; SSAS; RSQ-s 
Sequence B = SSAS, FMI-13, RSQ-s; PDS 
Sequence C = PDS; RSQ-s; FMI-13; SSAS 
The set of three packs randomly containing either sequence A, B, or C each, 
was prepared in advance of the first meeting with prospective participants. 
After consenting to participate in the study, each participant was given a set of 
packs 1-3. For ease of identification, each pack was labeled with the 
participant’s unique research ID, the pack No (i.e. 1, 2 or 3) and the specific 
sequence (i.e. A, B, or C). When completing the state measures contained in 
each pack, participants were also asked to write down their research ID, and 
the date and time they completed that specific pack. 
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2.8. Ethics 
The study was granted ethical approval (code: 2014/080) prior to commencing 
recruitment (appendix 10). All participants gave written consent to take part. 
The main ethical considerations of the study concerned the possibility that by 
reflecting on potentially distressing experiences (i.e., paranoia, rumination) 
over a 2-week period, this could temporarily affect participants’ mood, 
although such experiences were not expected to have a lasting effect. To 
minimize the potential impact of the study on participants’ mood, they were 
provided with information both at the initial (appendix 7) and last (appendix 9) 
stages of the study, advising them to see their GP, contact the Samaritans, or 
access the University Health Centre if they experienced any difficulties or had 
any concerns during/following participation.
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RESULTS 
 
3.1. Overview 
 
The first section of this chapter describes the data cleaning methods used to 
prepare the data prior to statistical analysis, including examining normality of 
distributions and homogeneity of variance. Details regarding the procedures 
used to manage missing data and outliers are then provided. This is followed 
by a brief rationale regarding the data analytic strategy to calculate ‘variability’ 
in state measures over time, and a descriptive analysis of the sample and the 
study variables. The five hypotheses are then outlined and the statistical 
analyses employed to test each of them along with the respective findings are 
also reported. Main findings concerning the study’s directional hypotheses 
(i.e. H1 and H4) are reported using significance levels for one-tailed tests (i.e., 
p = .05), whereas results regarding non-directional hypotheses (i.e. H2, H3 
and H5) are reported using significance levels for two-tailed tests (i.e., p = .05; 
see section 3.6. below). All statistical analyses were conducted using the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), version 21. 
 
3.2. Data cleaning 
 
Data cleaning consisted of examining the whole dataset using descriptive 
statistics, which helped confirm if all available data were within expected 
ranges. Screening for missing values was carried out for the study variables 
over each of the different data points (i.e. baseline assessments, three sets of 
state measures over 2 weeks, and personal experiences of paranoia at the 
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end of the 2-week period) (Drotar, 2009). Examination of frequencies revealed 
that there were no missing values for any of the baseline measures and for 
paranoia experiences as measured by the PEPS (Ellett et al., 2003). A small 
amount of missing data was detected for state measures (1-2 data points). 
Given the overall low frequency of missing values in the dataset, no specific 
statistical method was chosen to replace missing data (Drotar, 2009). Instead, 
handling of missing data relied on SPSS’ default procedures of listwise (i.e. 
removing cases with missing values on variables under analysis) and pairwise 
(i.e. removing specific missing values from the analysis rather than whole 
cases) deletion. 
 
Further screens were also carried out to identify outliers and to ensure 
normality assumptions for use of parametric tests were met (Miles & Shevlin, 
2005). These are described below. 
 
3.2.1. Outliers 
 
Outliers were defined as scores that were three or more standard deviations 
from the sample mean (Field, 2009). One to two outliers were identified for a 
small number of measures. Extreme scores did not affect normality of 
distributions (see section 3.2.2. below) and were retained to prevent loss of 
power (Osborne, 2002; Field, 2009). 
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3.2.2. Normality assumptions 
 
The study variables were checked for normality and homogeneity of variance 
through inspection of histograms with normal curve and by calculating 
skewness and kurtosis z-scores according to the following formulae: 
 
 Z skewness    = ____S–0___                  Z kurtosis    =  __K–0__ 
           SE skewness                                         SE kurtosis
 
Distributions were considered normal if z-scores for both skewness and 
kurtosis were lower than 2.58 (p < .01) (Field, 2009). All variables had 
acceptable levels of skew and kurtosis, with skewness ranging between 0.13-
0.66 for trait measures and between 0.02-0.95 for state measures, whereas 
kurtosis ranged between 0.25-.0.66 for trait measures and between 0.37-0.65 
for state measures. Therefore, normality assumptions were met and no data 
transformations were needed.  
 
3.3. Data analysis strategy – ‘variability’ in state measures over time 
 
According to Eid and Diener (1999), ‘variability’ concerns the temporal 
amplitude of individual psychological states and is the statistical equivalent of 
within-person standard deviation (SD) or variance in such states across time. 
Thus, higher variability in a specific psychological dimension, indicates 
dynamic patterns characterised by more extreme deviations from an 
individual’s mean level (close to zero) regarding that psychological process or 
factor, whereas lower variability characterises the opposite pattern (Kernis, 
Lakey, & Heppner, 2008; Zeigler-Hill & Showers, 2007). This approach has 
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guided research looking at the association between variability/instability in 
specific cognitive-affective factors (e.g. self-esteem) and paranoia (e.g. 
Thewissen, Myin-Germeys, Bentall, de Graaf, Vollebergh, & van Os, 2007). 
Therefore, to ensure consistency with previous literature in the field, when 
testing H3 in this study (see section 3.6.3 below), state variability was 
calculated by computing the standard deviation of each participant’s total 
state scores across the three random time point assessments during the 2-
week period, such that higher standard deviation scores indicate increased 
state variability/instability.   
 
3.4. Sample characteristics 
 
The sample characteristics are presented in Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2 – Sample characteristics 
 Total N = 86 
Age in years   
Mean 20.71 
Standard Deviation 4.92 
Gender N (%)  
Male 14 (16.3%) 
Female 72 (83.7%) 
Field of study N (%)  
Psychology degree 62 (72.1%) 
Other degree 24 (27.9%) 
Ethnicity N (%)  
White British 37 (43.0%) 
White Other 24 (27.9%) 
Asian British 7 (8.1%) 
Asian Other 14 (16.3%) 
Other 4 (4.7%) 
Mindfulness knowledgeN (%)  
Yes 25 (29.4%) 
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No 60 (70.6%) 
Mindfulness practice N (%)  
Yes 14 (16.5%) 
No 71 (83.5%) 
Mindfulness competence N (%)  
Beginner 11 (78.6%) 
Intermediate 3 (21.4%) 
Self-reported Mental Health Diagnosis 
N (%) 
 
Yes 15 (18.3%) 
No 67 (81.7%) 
Note: No differences were found on any of the study variables when comparing participants  
who self-reported a mental health diagnosis and those who did not.  
 
According to the information above, the sample predominantly comprised of 
female psychology students, of White ethnicity, with no previous knowledge or 
experience of mindfulness, and without a self-reported mental health 
diagnosis. 
 
3.5. Descriptive analysis of study variables 
 
3.5.1. Trait and state measures 
Means and standard deviations were computed for the main study variables 
corresponding to baseline and state measures, as shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics for baseline (trait) and state measures  
          Baseline:                                         State:                             
Mean              Range                   Mean             Range                    
(SD)                actual                    (SD)                actual 
Paranoia 44.60              23-82                    15.47                7-33                  
(13.10)                                         (5.40) 
Public Self-
Consciousness 
18.86               5-28                     10.94                3-19                  
(4.40)                                           (4.04)  
Rumination 
 
31.48               5-59                     10.25                0-33                  
(11.41)                                         (7.43)  
Mindfulness 
 
97.24              57-129                   20.47               7-38                
(15.33)                                         (6.40)  
Problem 
Behaviour 
120.15            69-195                     --                      -- 
(23.58) 
Note. Total N=86 for trait measures. Total N’s ranged between 82-83 for state measures. 
 
As shown in Table 3 above, mean levels of trait paranoia, as assessed by the 
Paranoia Scale (PS), were similar to those found in the validation paper 
(Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) and other nonclinical studies (e.g. Ellett et al., 
2003).  
3.5.2. Personal experiences of paranoia 
In relation to self-reported paranoia experiences from the PEPS, 21% of 
participants (N=18) reported a paranoid experience, which occurred during 
the two-week study period. A descriptive analysis of the cognitive dimension 
of the PEPS (see section 2.5.4. above) also revealed that most of the 
participants who endorsed a paranoid experience at the end of the 2 weeks, 
reported feeling negative judgement by others (M = 3.94, SD = 1.00), and 
preoccupation with these feelings (M = 3.78, SD = 1.11). Paranoia 
experiences also had a significant impact on the wellbeing of most 
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participants (M = 3.28, SD = 0.75), feeling powerless to stop what was 
happening to them (M = 3.33, SD = 1.14), as well as feeling blocked from 
achieving their goals (M = 2.83, SD = 1.20). Only a minority of participants (M 
= 2.06, SD = 1.21) described their paranoia experience as deserved, whereas 
14 out of 18 participants answered ‘No’ to the question: ‘at the present 
moment, has there been any change in your beliefs?’.  
3.6 Hypothesis testing 
 
3.6.1. (H1): At baseline, trait paranoia will be associated with trait measures of 
public self-consciousness, rumination (positive correlation) and mindfulness 
(negative correlation), and with a global measure of problem behaviour 
(positive correlation).  
Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation coefficients were calculated to 
examine the associations between baseline trait variables. Regarding the 
correlations between baseline measures and the PEPS, these were 
conducted using a point biserial correlation, as the PEPS produces a binary 
outcome (i.e. ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers as to whether participants have had an 
experience of paranoia in the last 2 weeks) (Table 4).  
Consistent with prediction, trait paranoia was positively correlated with trait 
measures of public self-consciousness and rumination and negatively 
correlated with trait mindfulness. This suggests that higher levels of paranoia 
are associated with higher levels of public self-consciousness and rumination, 
and lower levels of mindfulness. The positive correlation between trait 
paranoia and the global measure of problem behaviour was also consistent 
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with prediction, suggesting that higher levels of paranoia were associated with 
the propensity to engage in a range of maladaptive behaviours. All 
aforementioned correlations were statistically significant, and therefore the 
findings fully support H1. 
Table 4.  Correlations of paranoia (PS scores) and personal experiences 
of paranoia (PEPS scores) with baseline measures 
 
Note. Total N for trait measures = 86. Total N for PEPS = 84. *p < .05; **p < .01;  
***p < .001 (all p’s one-tailed) 
 
 
3.6.2. (H2): State paranoia, public self-awareness, rumination and 
mindfulness taken at three random time points over the 2-week period will 
correlate. 
 
H2 tests the relationships between state measures of paranoia, public self-
awareness, rumination and mindfulness across all three random time points 
during the 2-week period. Testing of this hypothesis was carried out using 
Pearson’s Product Moment Correlations between mean scores of each of the 
four state measures. Mean scores were calculated by averaging the total 
scores for each state measure across all three time points. Point biserial 
Baseline measures  
 
Trait Paranoia 
(PS scores)  
Paranoia 
Experiences  
(PEPS scores)  Trait Paranoia                 --               .24* 
 Trait Public Self-
Consciousness 
              .27**    .30** 
Trait Rumination     .62*** 
 
             .33** 
Trait Mindfulness             -.57***             -.32** 
Problem Behaviour   .38***  .20* 
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correlations were also carried out to examine the relationship between the 
PEPS and the four state measures. 
 
As shown in Table 5 below, for all three random time points over the 2-week 
period, statistically significant positive correlations were found between state 
paranoia and state measures of public self-awareness and rumination, 
whereas statistically significant negative correlations were also found between 
state mindfulness and state measures of paranoia, public self-awareness and 
rumination. These findings suggest that higher levels of state paranoia are 
associated with, or co-occur with, higher levels of state public self-awareness 
and state rumination, whereas lower levels of state paranoia, rumination and 
public self-awareness, are associated with higher levels of state mindfulness. 
These findings fully support H2. 
 
Table 5. Inter-correlations between state measures (mean scores) and  
association with paranoia experiences (PEPS scores) 
 
Measures 1 2 3 4 5 
1. State Paranoia (mean score) -- .44***. 67*** -.40***  .34** 
2. State Public Self-Awareness 
(mean score) 
 -- .46***    -.26*     .04 
3. State Rumination (mean score)  
 
 -- -.39*** .26* 
4. State Mindfulness (mean score)    -- -.31** 
5. Paranoia experiences (PEPS 
scores) 
    -- 
Note. Total N’s ranged between 81-83 for state measures. Total N for PEPS = 84.  * p < .05, 
** p < .01, *** p < .001 (all p’s two-tailed) 
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3.6.3. (H3): Trait paranoia will predict variability in state measures of 
paranoia, public self-awareness, rumination and mindfulness. 
 
H3 tests whether trait paranoia predicts variability in state measures of 
paranoia, public self-awareness, rumination and mindfulness, across a 2-
week period.  
 
Prior to conducting the regression analyses, correlations were first computed 
to examine the relationships between trait and variability in state measures. 
As previously discussed (see section 3.3. above, p. 74), state variability was 
calculated by computing the standard deviation of each participant’s total 
state scores across the three random time point assessments during the 2-
week period. Correlations between trait and state variability measures 
revealed that only the association between trait paranoia and variability in 
state paranoia was statistically significant. Therefore, Standard Linear 
Regression was performed with variability in state paranoia as the DV and 
trait paranoia at baseline as the IV. When running this analysis in SPSS, 
several strategies were used to check whether assumptions for Standard 
Linear Regression had been met. These included examination of: a) the 
scatterplot of normalised vs. predicted residuals to identify linearity and 
homogeneity of variance violations; b) the residuals’ histogram and 
cumulative probability plot to identify normality violations, and c) the residuals 
scatterplot and the Durbin-Watson statistic to evaluate independence of errors 
(Miles & Shevlin, 2005). These checks revealed that in this study, 
assumptions for Standard Linear Regression were met. Regarding the 
outcome of the regression model, results showed that trait paranoia at 
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baseline significantly predicted variability in state paranoia ( = .32, t(81) = 
3.00 p<.01). Trait paranoia also explained a significant proportion of variance 
in variability in state paranoia scores (R2  = .10; F(1,81) = 9.03, p<.01). These 
findings partially support H3. 
 
3.6.4. (H4): Trait paranoia, public self-consciousness, rumination (positive 
correlation) and mindfulness (negative correlation) at baseline will predict 
paranoia experiences as measured by the PEPS after 2 weeks. 
H4 tests whether trait measures (IVs) predict personal experiences of 
paranoia (DV). As previously mentioned, the PEPS produces a dichotomous 
categorical variable, consisting of two distinct categories (i.e. ‘0’ for absence 
of a paranoid experience and ‘1’ for presence of a paranoia experience). 
Therefore, the testing of this hypothesis was carried out using Binary Logistic 
Regression coefficients. Because all four trait measures significantly 
correlated with paranoia experiences (see Table 4 above) they were all 
entered simultaneously as IVs in the regression model. When running this 
analysis in SPSS, only linearity assumption checks were carried out as 
logistic regression is usually thought as having no other assumptions 
(Weunsch, 2014). These checks consisted of using the Boxwell-Tidwell Test, 
whereby the interactions between the continuous predictor variables and their 
logs are included in the regression model and if found significant this indicates 
linearity is not assumed (Wuensch, 2014). In the current model none of the 
interactions were significant; therefore, linearity assumptions for Binary 
Logistic Regression were met.  
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Regarding the outcome of the binary logistic regression, results showed that 
the full logistic regression model containing the aforementioned four 
predictors was statistically significant (X2(4) = 15.48, df = 8, N = 84, p<.01) 
indicating that the independent variables (i.e. trait measures of paranoia, 
public self-consciousness, rumination and mindfulness) significantly predicted 
the outcome variable, endorsement of personal paranoid experiences. The 
results of the data analysis presented in Table 6 below show the logistic 
regression coefficients, Wald test, and odds ratios for each of the predictor 
variables. The results of Cox & Snell, and Nagelkerke R squared estimates 
indicated that the whole model explained between 16.8% and 26.0% of the 
variance that can be predicted from the independent variables. The model 
classified correctly 27.8% of the respondents who endorsed a personal 
paranoid experience and 98.5% of those who did not endorse such 
experience, for an overall classification success rate of 83.3%. As shown in 
Table 6 below, of all independent variables, only one predictor - public self-
consciousness - was statistically significant. Thus, after controlling for shared 
variance with the other three independent variables, only public self-
consciousness proved to be an independent and significant predictor of 
endorsement of paranoid experiences (B = 0.17, SE = 0.09, p = .025), 
whereas trait measures of paranoia, rumination and mindfulness were not 
independently predictive of such experiences (B = -0.00, SE = 0.03, p = .431; 
B = 0.04, SE = 0.04, p = .140; B = -0.03, SE = 0.03, p = .132, respectively). 
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Table 6 – Prediction of paranoia experiences (PEPS scores) from trait 
measures 
 
 
According to the information above, although trait measures of paranoia, 
public self-consciousness, rumination and mindfulness had a combined 
predictive effect on personal experiences of paranoia at the end of the 2-week 
period, only public self-consciousness was independently predictive of such 
experiences. These findings partially support H4. 
 
3.6.5. (H5): State paranoia, public self-awareness, rumination and 
mindfulness will predict paranoia experiences as measured by the PEPS after 
2 weeks. 
H5 tests the prediction of paranoia experiences from state measures of 
paranoia, public self-awareness, rumination and mindfulness. As with H4, the 
testing of this hypothesis was carried out using Binary Logistic Regression 
coefficients given the categorical nature of the DV (i.e. PEPS). For each of the 
state measures, the total mean score, across the three random time point 
assessments was used. Only state measures that significantly correlated with 
the PEPS were entered as IVs in the regression model. As shown in Table 5 
 Paranoia (PEPS scores) 
Trait measures  B     S.E. Wald         
X2 
P  
 (one tailed) 
Odds   
Ratio 
Paranoia -0.00 0.03 0.03 0.431   0.99 
Public Self-
Consciousness 
0.17 0.09 3.83 0.025  1.18 
Rumination 0.04 0.04  1.17 0.140 1.04 
Mindfulness -0.03 0.03  1.24 0.132 0.04 
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above, state measures of paranoia, rumination and mindfulness significantly 
correlated with the PEPS; therefore, they were entered simultaneously as IVs 
in the regression model. When running this analysis in SPSS, only linearity 
assumption checks were carried out as logistic regression is usually thought 
as having no other assumptions (Weunsch, 2014). As with H4, these checks 
consisted of using the Boxwell-Tidwell Test, whereby the interactions between 
the continuous predictor variables and their logs are included in the 
regression model and if found significant this indicates linearity is not 
assumed (Wuensch, 2014). In the current model none of the interactions were 
significant; therefore, linearity assumptions for Binary Logistic Regression 
were met.  
Regarding the outcome of the binary logistic regression, results showed that 
the full logistic regression model containing the aforementioned three 
predictors was statistically significant (X2(3) = 12.30, df = 8, N = 81, p<.01) 
indicating that the independent variables (i.e. state measures of paranoia, 
rumination and mindfulness) significantly predicted the outcome variable, 
endorsement of personal paranoid experiences. The results of the data 
analysis presented in Table 7 below show the logistic regression coefficients, 
Wald test, and odds ratios for each of the predictor variables. The results of 
Cox & Snell, and Nagelkerke R squared estimates indicated that the whole 
model explained between 14.1% and 21.9% of the variance that can be 
predicted from the independent variables. The model classified correctly 
29.4% of the respondents who endorsed a personal paranoid experience and 
96.9% of those who did not endorse such experience, for an overall 
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classification success rate of 82.7%. As shown in Table 7 below, none of the 
independent variables was statistically significant. Thus, after controlling for 
shared variance between the three variables, none of these (i.e. state 
measures of paranoia, rumination and mindfulness) were independently 
predictive of endorsement of paranoid experiences (B = 0.10, SE = 0.08, p = 
.172; B = 0.00, SE = 0.05, p = .948; B = -0.10, SE = 0.05, p = .069, 
respectively). However, a trend was identified whereby the independent 
predictive status of mindfulness with regard to endorsement of paranoid 
experiences almost reached statistical significance. 
 
Table 7 – Prediction of paranoia experiences (PEPS scores) from state 
measures
 
According to the information above, although state measures of paranoia, 
rumination and mindfulness had a combined predictive effect on personal 
experiences of paranoia at the end of the 2-week period, none of these 
variables was independently predictive of such experiences. Therefore, 
findings do not support H5.
 Paranoia (PEPS scores) 
State measures (mean 
scores) 
B   S.E. Wald 
X2 
P  
 (two-tailed) 
Odds 
Ratio 
Paranoia 0.10 0.08 1.86 0.172 1.11 
Rumination  0.00 0.05  0.00 0.948 1.00 
Mindfulness  -0.10 0.05 3.32 0.069 0.90 
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DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. Overview 
The current study made novel theoretical and methodological contributions to 
paranoia research by investigating correlates and predictors of paranoid 
cognitions and personal experiences of paranoia in a nonclinical student 
sample. Specifically, this study: (1) examined the associations between 
paranoia and three cognitive factors (i.e. self-consciousness, rumination, and 
mindfulness) that have been theoretically implicated in paranoid cognitions 
formation and maintenance; (2) investigated the association between 
paranoia and a global measure of problem behaviour; (3) examined the 
temporal and dynamic relationships between paranoia and the three 
aforementioned cognitive factors, by investigating the concurrent and 
predictive association between these variables at trait and state levels over a 
period of 2 weeks; and (4) investigated the prediction of individual 
experiences of paranoia, as measured by the PEPS (Ellett et al., 2003) from 
pre-defined/standard trait and state measures of paranoia and the three 
cognitive factors.  
This chapter will initially present the study’s main findings, which will be 
divided into three different sections, and related to each of the hypotheses 
under investigation (see below). Each set of findings is discussed based on 
relevant theory and empirical research, followed by recommendations for 
future research. Theoretical and clinical implications of the research are then 
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outlined, after which strengths and limitations of the study are also discussed. 
The chapter will then close with a conclusion section. 
4.2. Main findings 
4.2.1. Cognitive and behavioural correlates of trait paranoia. 
Contemporary models of paranoid delusions have identified a number of 
cognitive factors as being directly implicated in the formation and 
maintenance of paranoid cognitions (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, 
& Kinderman, 2001; Chadwick, 2006; Freeman et al., 2012). Among those 
factors postulated to exacerbate and/or maintain these distressing 
beliefs/experiences are public self-consciousness (Fenigstein & Vanable, 
1992) and ruminative thinking (Freeman et al., 2002), whereas mindful 
responses can help minimise the impact of such experiences (Chadwick, 
2006). In light of the common, recurrent and distressing nature of nonclinical 
paranoia (Ellett et al, 2003; Freeman et al., 2011), it would also be 
advantageous to determine the associations between these variables and 
paranoid thinking in nonclinical samples. However, whilst several studies have 
found an association between public self-consciousness and nonclinical 
paranoia (e.g. Bodner & Mikulincer; 1998; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992; Martin 
& Penn, 2001; von Gemmingen et al., 2003), research focusing on the 
association between paranoia, rumination and mindfulness is less well 
established (Simpson et al., 2012; Oliver et al., 2012b).  Furthermore, often 
these factors are studied in isolation rather than together, which precludes 
more theoretical integration in this line of research (Freeman et al., 2007). 
One of the aims of this study, therefore, was to concurrently examine the 
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association between nonclinical paranoia and public self-consciousness, 
rumination and mindfulness, at trait level.  
In line with a priori prediction, nonclinical paranoia was significantly 
associated with all three cognitive factors; trait paranoia correlated positively 
with public self-consciousness and rumination, and negatively with a trait 
measure of mindfulness. These findings support and extend existing research 
on correlates of nonclinical paranoia, as well as being consistent with 
theoretical models that highlight cognitive processes in the development and 
persistence of paranoid cognitions (Chadwick, 2006; Freeman et al., 2002).  
For example, the association between nonclinical paranoia and public self-
consciousness replicates findings from earlier studies using student samples 
(Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992; Martin & Penn, 2001). The tendency to be 
publicly self-conscious or direct one’s attention towards aspects of the self 
which are presented to others (e.g. appearance and social behaviour), has 
long been identified as a defining characteristic of paranoid thought in both 
clinical and nonclinical samples (Haynes, 1986; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). 
The association between paranoia and public self-consciousness also serves 
to reinforce the notion of paranoid beliefs as inherently interpersonal in nature 
(Freeman & Garety, 2000), as it highlights the sense of perceived threat, 
vulnerability and mistrust of others which underlies (and potentially maintains) 
such beliefs (Combs & Penn, 2004; Freeman et al., 2002; von Gemminen et 
al., 2003).  
 
 90
The strong association between trait paranoia and dispositional rumination 
also replicates findings from a limited number of studies focusing on this 
relationship (Melo & Bentall, 2010; Simpson et al., 2012). Theoretically, 
rumination has been identified as playing a crucial role in perpetuating the 
distress associated with persecutory delusions (Chadwick, 2006; Freeman et 
al., 2007). Although not directly assessing rumination, clinical research has 
provided some evidence supporting a link between RNT processes and 
delusions (e.g. Freeman & Garety, 1999; Startup, Freeman, & Garety, 2007). 
Regarding nonclinical research, the association between trait paranoia and 
dispositional rumination has recently been investigated in a student sample by 
Simpson et al. (2012). The authors reported a large correlation between these 
variables, therefore mirroring the findings of this study. However, the strong 
association between trait paranoia and trait rumination reported by Simpson 
et al. (2012) is potentially confounded with depression as their trait rumination 
measure included items relating to negative mood states, prompting 
participants to rate their ruminative responses when “feeling down, sad or 
depressed” (Simpson et al., 2012, p. 616). In contrast, the measure of trait 
rumination used in the current study does not contain items, which explicitly 
focus on negative affect (i.e. do not contain words such as ‘sad’ or 
‘depressed’) but rather captures specific aspects of RNT (e.g. level of thought 
repetitiveness, intrusiveness, and unproductiveness) (Ehring et al., 2011). 
Therefore, compared to Simpson et al.’s (2012) study and as highlighted by 
Treynor et al. (2003), the current findings of a large correlation between trait 
paranoia and dispositional rumination are more likely to suggest a 
fundamental association between these constructs rather than being the 
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product of measurement artifact (i.e. due to shared items which tap similar 
experiences such as depression). Notwithstanding these considerations, 
findings from both studies suggest that in keeping with substantial evidence of 
the transdiagnostic role of rumination across several disorders (Ehring & 
Watkins, 2008), this cognitive process may also be a cardinal feature of 
paranoid thinking in nonclinical samples.   
The large negative correlation between trait paranoia and dispositional 
mindfulness is also consistent with Chadwick’s (2006) model describing 
mindful responses as effective coping strategies to reduce the distress 
associated with psychotic sensations. Furthermore, this finding adds to an 
emerging evidence base linking mindfulness with delusional beliefs, which is 
predominantly derived from intervention studies carried out with clinical 
samples (e.g. Chadwick, Taylor, & Abba, 2005; Chadwick et al., 2009; 
Langer, Kangas, Salcedo, & Fuentes, 2012). Furthermore, the suggestion that 
increased mindfulness abilities are related to reduced paranoid ideation is in 
line with nonclinical research showing that mindfulness predicts less 
delusional ideation over time (Oliver et al., 2012b). However, in the latter 
study, only the ‘accept without judgement’ mindfulness dimension was 
predictive of decreased subclinical delusions at 6 months follow-up, whereas 
associations between other mindfulness constructs and delusions were 
counterintuitive (e.g. the ‘Observe’ subscale positively correlated with all 
delusional dimensions) (Oliver et al., 2012b). More recently, 
recommendations have been made to exclude the ‘Observe’ facet so as to 
ensure mindfulness measures are more structurally acceptable for use with 
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nonclinical samples (Williams et al., 2014). This recommendation was 
followed in the current study. Therefore, it is possible that compared to Oliver 
et al.’s (2012b) investigation, findings from the current study more accurately 
capture the relationship between paranoia and mindfulness in a nonclinical 
student sample. 
Maladaptive coping behaviours have also been identified as having a key role 
in the emergence and maintenance of persecutory delusions (e.g. Chadwick, 
2006).It has also been suggested that behavioural avoidance, withdrawal and 
impulsivity are common in samples that experience paranoid thinking and 
may serve an emotion regulation function (e.g. Kesting, Bredenpohl, Klenke, 
Westermann, & Lincoln, 2013; Westermann & Lincoln, 2011). Evidence has 
also been found linking subclinical paranoia and discrete problem behaviours 
such as substance misuse (Freeman et al., 2011) and aggressive behaviour 
(Fanning et al., 2011). However, by mostly focusing on discrete maladaptive 
behaviours, the above research often fails to recognize the comorbidity 
characterizing problem behaviours, whereby dysregulated behaviour in a 
specific area usually co-exists with behavioural difficulties in other areas 
(Wupperman et al., 2012). Therefore, the current study aimed to investigate 
the association between trait paranoia and a global measure of problem 
behaviour. A strong positive association (moderate in size) was found 
between both variables.  One way of interpreting this association is through 
the emotion regulation framework, which suggests emotional dysregulation is 
a key process underlying both nonclinical paranoia and problem behaviours 
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(Hayes et al., 1996; Kingston et al., 2010; Westermann & Lincoln, 2010; 
Westermann, Kesting, & Lincoln, 2012). 
This finding is also consistent with nonclinical research showing that 
individuals with higher levels of paranoia are prone to using maladaptive 
behaviours as a way of coping, such as ‘dangerous activities’ (e.g. using 
alcohol, drugs), ‘emotional outbursts’ and ‘disinvestment in their social 
network’ (Melo & Bentall, 2010).       
To advance knowledge of correlates and predictors of nonclinical paranoia 
further, future research could employ more powerful statistical strategies such 
as Structural Equation Modelling to help identify the unique and shared 
contribution of cognitive, affective, and behavioural variables to paranoid 
thinking. For stronger inferences of causality to be made regarding the 
association between nonclinical paranoia and theoretically relevant cognitive 
and behavioural processes, designs that allow examination of the temporal 
association between these variables (i.e. longitudinal) are also warranted. For 
example, naturalistic prospective studies may be particularly useful in 
disentangling how the cognitive factors of interest in this study relate to day-
to-day behavioural manifestations of paranoia (e.g. social isolation). This 
approach can also help refine theoretical models by clarifying the nature of 
the relationship between paranoia and a wider range of theoretically relevant 
cognitive processes such as reasoning biases (e.g. jumping to conclusions), 
self-consciousness, rumination and mindfulness. Naturalistic prospective 
research could also usefully focus on the association between cognitive 
processes and the different dimensions of paranoia (i.e. frequency, conviction, 
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preoccupation, deservedness, and distress levels). Although these 
multidimensional aspects of delusional thinking have been found to fluctuate 
over time and be predicted by different cognitive variables in clinical samples 
(e.g. Ben-Zeev, Morris, Swendsen, & Granholm, 2012; Peters et al., 2012), 
this is yet to be demonstrated among nonclinical populations.   
 
4.2.2. Temporal and dynamic relationship between nonclinical paranoia, 
public self-awareness, rumination and mindfulness over a 2-week period: 
4.2.2.1. Inter-correlation between state measures 
Naturalistic prospective research has shown there is short-term (within hours 
and days) fluctuation in delusional beliefs in both clinical and nonclinical 
samples (e.g. Myin-Germeys, Nicolson, & Delespaul, 2001; Thewissen, 
Bentall, Lecomte, van Os, & Myin-Germeys, 2008). Collectively, these studies 
have advanced current knowledge of the psychological mechanisms 
underlying the maintenance of paranoid beliefs in the context of daily life by 
using ecologically valid methods (e.g. ESM in computerised or booklet 
versions) (Myin-Germeys et al., 2009). Such methodologies are suitable for 
examining the dynamic processes emphasised in influential models of 
delusion formation and maintenance (Chadwick, 2006; Freeman et al., 2002). 
ESM-based clinical research has mostly focused on contextual factors 
associated with affective variables and psychosis (Myin-Germeys et al., 2005; 
Vilardaga et al., 2013), whereas nonclinical research using ESM has mainly 
focused on the association between natural variation in paranoia and 
temporal variability in a range of cognitive-affective factors such as negative 
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affect (Kramer et al., 2013), self-esteem (Thewissen et al., 2011) and 
experiential avoidance (Udachina et al., 2009). Therefore, the study of 
nonclinical paranoia from a dynamic perspective is yet to consider its temporal 
relationship with other theoretically relevant cognitive factors, such as those 
identified in the current study.  
Using a naturalistic prospective design, this study aimed to provide unique 
evidence of the temporal relationship between momentary levels of state 
paranoia and natural fluctuation in state public self-awareness, rumination and 
mindfulness, as well as examining the interrelationship between these 
processes over time.  As predicted, state measures of paranoia, public self-
awareness, rumination and mindfulness taken at three random times over the 
course of two weeks, significantly correlated. All correlations were in the 
expected direction, whereby higher levels of state paranoia were associated 
with higher levels of public self-awareness and rumination, and with lower 
levels of state mindfulness over the 2-week period. This finding is consistent 
with the aforementioned association between these variables at a trait level 
(see section 4.2.1. above, p. 88). Together, these findings support theory that 
highlights processes of high self-consciousness about others’ judgements, 
repetitive negative thinking and decreased mindful abilities as inherent to the 
emergence and maintenance of paranoid beliefs (Chadwick, 2006; Fenigstein 
& Vanable, 1992; Freeman et al., 2007).  
Furthermore, the temporal interrelationship between the three state cognitive 
measures also suggests that these processes naturally fluctuate and co-occur 
over time in a consistent fashion. Thus, current perception’s of oneself as the 
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focus of others’ attention co-occurs with pondering/dwelling on the causes 
and implications of one’s problems, in the context of low mindful awareness. 
This finding is also consistent with cross-sectional research, which although 
not specific to paranoia, has shown higher dispositional mindfulness is 
associated with lower rumination (e.g. Raes & Williams, 2010) and public self-
consciousness (e.g. Perona-Garcelan et al., 2014) at a trait level. Results are 
also similar to evidence showing reductions in state rumination following both 
a mindfulness induction (Hilt & Pollak, 2012), and interventions  (e.g. Shahar, 
Britton, Sbarra, Figueredo, & Bootzin, 2010; Snippe, Bos, van der Ploeg, 
Saderman, Fleer, & Schroevers, 2014; van Aalderen, Donders, Giommi, 
Spinhoven, Barendregt, & Speckens, 2012).  
The current finding of a relationship between mindfulness and rumination, 
also seems to fit with other theoretical accounts, which emphasise 
mindfulness ability (whether at trait or state level) as helping individuals from 
disengaging in negative cognitive processes known to exacerbate 
psychological distress, such as perseverative and judgemental brooding 
(Garland, Gaylord, & Park, 2009; Garland, Fredrickson, Kring, Johnson, 
Meyer, & Penn, 2010). In their ‘upward spiral’ mindful coping model, Garland 
and colleagues (Garland et al., 2009) highlight a dynamic process whereby 
mindfulness helps disengage from rumination via an increased ability for 
psychological flexibility or capacity to use a wider range of adaptive cognitive 
strategies (such as positive reappraisal of stressful events), which in turn 
substantially reduces psychological distress over time (Garland, Gaylord, & 
Fredrickson, 2011). This is particularly relevant to paranoia, given evidence 
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showing that among individuals experiencing psychotic-like experiences 
mindfulness in the form of increased psychological flexibility (i.e. reappraising 
stressful events in a non-judgemental and decentred way) predicts less 
symptom-related distress (Morris, Garety, & Peters, 2014). Thus, the dynamic 
processes described in Garland et al.’s (2010) model, may also underlie the 
naturally ongoing interplay between momentary paranoid thinking and other 
co-occurring cognitive processes or states, which is suggested by the current 
findings. However, this interpretation is only tentative as measures of 
cognitive reappraisal were not included in the present study.       
4.2.2.2. Prediction of variability in state measures from trait paranoia 
Although some evidence suggests the cognitive variables under investigation 
are subject to natural variability over time (e.g. see Dickson et al., 2012 for 
rumination variability), this is yet to be shown in relation to psychotic-related 
phenomena. Besides triggering and maintaining persecutory ideation and 
psychosis-related distress, these cognitive processes may also be influenced 
by pre-existing vulnerability to paranoid thinking (Chadwick, 2006; Freeman et 
al., 2002). Thus, a reasonable assumption is that dispositional paranoia may 
alter the dynamics of natural variation in current paranoid thinking and 
cognitive states of public self-awareness, rumination and mindfulness. Testing 
this hypothesis in a nonclinical sample was a novel aim of this study. The 
hypothesis that trait paranoia will predict variability in state measures was only 
partially supported, as results showed that trait paranoia significantly 
predicted variability in state paranoia but did not predict variability in state 
measures pertaining to the three cognitive factors.  
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The prediction of variability in ‘paranoid’ states from trait paranoia is 
consistent with evidence showing individuals with higher psychosis 
vulnerability are more likely to experience psychotic experiences (e.g. unusual 
perceptions or thought interference) in daily life (Verdoux et al., 2003a). 
Furthermore, results also highlight that even in the context of higher pre-
existing vulnerability to paranoia, individuals experience short-term 
fluctuations in such thinking rather than constantly feeling similar levels of 
‘paranoia’ across time.   
Contrary to prediction, trait paranoia did not predict variability in state 
measures of public self-awareness, rumination and mindfulness. This could 
be attributed to overall low levels of temporal variation in cognitive processes 
found in this nonclinical sample (i.e. at each time point, variability values 
ranged between 1.07 and 1.52SD from the mean, which is around zero). 
These lower variability levels may be indexing ‘cognitive stability’ over time 
characterizing a nonclinical ‘healthy’ population, as opposed to more variable 
or unstable patterns, which often underlie dysregulation in psychological 
processes among clinical samples (e.g. Myin-Germeys et al., 2003, Myin-
Germeys et al., 2009; Varese, Udachina, Myin-Germeys, Oorschot & Bentall, 
2011). More adaptive/stable patterns have also been shown to be less 
predictive of psychological maladjustment (Houben et al., 2015). Therefore, 
overall stability of cognitive states in this study could possibly explain the 
failure in finding a significant effect regarding the prediction of variability in 
these variables from trait paranoia.  
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Equally plausible is that the 2-week period may have also been too short for 
any meaningful fluctuation in the abovementioned cognitive states to take 
place and to significantly impact the predicted associations with trait paranoia 
(Oliver et al., 2012b). This is however unlikely given evidence showing the 
prediction of psychotic symptoms from ‘variability’ in cognitive-affective 
processes (e.g. negative affect and ‘suspiciousness’) over a briefer timeframe 
(i.e. 5 consecutive days) (Kramer et al., 2013). However, unlike the current 
investigation, the latter study used a much more time and resource-intensive 
methodology (i.e. ESM) enabling multiple assessments on a daily basis.  
 
The current findings can also be interpreted as potentially highlighting that 
factors, other than a general tendency to experience paranoid thinking (i.e. 
trait paranoia) may also influence short-term variability in state paranoia and 
other cognitive states. For example, it is worth considering the extent to which 
variation in cognitive states among individuals prone to paranoid thinking may 
also be explained by person-environment interactions rather than by pre-
existing vulnerability per se (Oorschot, Kwapil, Delespaul, & Myin-Germeys, 
2009). In fact, naturalistic prospective research has shown that individual 
characteristics interact with contextual variables to influence natural variation 
in delusional experiences in both clinical and nonclinical samples (e.g. Myin-
Germeys et al., 2001; Verdoux, Husky, Tournier, Sorbara, & Swendsen, 
2003b). This research includes Verdoux et al.’s (2003b) nonclinical study 
which showed participants with higher psychosis vulnerability reported more 
psychosis-related experiences (i.e. unusual perceptions) when accompanied 
by unfamiliar people than when spending time alone (Verdoux et al., 2003b). 
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As the current study examined the predictive association between trait 
paranoia and variability in cognitive states without accounting for the potential 
influence of contextual variables, this may also help explain the lack of a 
significant effect regarding this association.  
By studying the dynamic relationship between paranoia and the three 
cognitive factors in the 2-week period, a novel contribution of this study was to 
show that a) at state level, these variables fluctuate concurrently over time in 
an intuitive manner, and b) variability in paranoid states is directly influenced 
by trait paranoia. Future naturalistic prospective research could build on from 
these findings in several ways. First, more firm conclusions could be drawn 
regarding the role of the abovementioned cognitive factors in triggering and 
maintaining paranoia by examining which of these cognitive states (either 
individually or in combination) precede or influence subsequent paranoid 
thinking. Second, if the dynamic association between paranoia and these 
cognitive processes is examined in populations presenting with different levels 
of vulnerability to paranoid thinking, this may help in obtaining a wider range 
of variability in cognitive states. This strategy may in turn increase power to 
detect significant effects when testing hypotheses concerning explanatory 
factors and/or causal mechanisms underlying natural variation in paranoia 
and relevant cognitive states over time. Third, this line of inquiry may also 
benefit from examining the environmental circumstances in which variability in 
publicly self-aware, ruminative and mindful states is more likely to increase 
and/or decrease in the context of pre-morbid/trait paranoia, as well as 
exploring how such contextual factors may interact with this trait to influence 
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subsequent paranoid states. Fourth, compared to the current study, the use of 
ESM-based multiple daily assessments to capture ‘in-the-moment’ cognitive 
states will constitute a more methodologically sound and robust strategy for 
carrying out detailed examination of the temporal relationship between 
paranoia and the abovementioned cognitive factors. 
 
4.2.3. Personal experiences of paranoia: prediction from trait and state 
measures 
There is evidence that idiosyncratic measures of paranoia such as the PEPS 
can usefully examine the phenomenology of paranoia in nonclinical samples 
both cross-sectionally (Ellett et al., 2003) and in the context of qualitative 
descriptions of reasons for change in belief dimensions over time (Allen-
Crooks & Ellett, 2014). However, studies are yet to examine what factors may 
prospectively explain or influence occurrence of paranoid experiences when 
focusing on personally defined accounts and in the context of daily life. 
Furthermore, the extent to which idiosyncratic paranoid experiences may be 
influenced by theoretically relevant cognitive processes is currently unknown. 
Thus, a novel aim of this study was to use a naturalistic prospective design to 
examine the predictive relationship between pre-defined/standard measures 
of paranoia and theoretically relevant cognitive processes (at the trait and 
state levels) with personal paranoid experiences, as measured by the PEPS 
(Ellett et al., 2003).  
 
 102
The only supported prediction was that trait public self-consciousness 
significantly predicted personal accounts of paranoid experiences. This finding 
is consistent with theoretical and empirical work confirming high public self-
consciousness is a prominent feature of paranoid thinking, whereby increased 
attentiveness to aspects of the self which are presented to others contributes 
to irrational misinterpretations about others’ motives and actions towards the 
self (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992; Freeman et al., 2002; von Gemmingen et 
al., 2003). Publicly self-conscious individuals are more likely to believe they 
are the centre of other’s attention, thus perceiving themselves as potential 
targets of others’ malicious intentions against them; this tendency to perceive 
others’ covert and/or overt actions as being intentionally directed towards 
oneself is also known as the self-referent bias (Fenigstein, 1984; Fenigstein & 
Vanable, 1992; von Gemmingen et al., 2003). An information-processing style 
characterised by the combination of high suspiciousness and self-referent 
ideas is also thought to constitute a marker of cognitive vulnerability preceding 
the onset of delusional ideation (Bentall et al., 2001). This interpretation also 
fits in with current findings concerning the descriptive analysis of the PEPS, 
which confirmed most participants who endorsed a paranoid experience over 
the 2-week period, felt they had been the target of negative judgement by 
others and felt powerless to stop what others had done to them. Furthermore, 
only a small minority of these individuals felt that what had been done to them 
was totally undeserved. Thus, in a nonclinical sample, endorsement of 
paranoia experiences linked to the perception of deliberate harm from others 
(i.e. PEPS responses) over a brief period of time (i.e. 2 weeks) appears to be 
characterised by thoughts and feelings of interpersonal vulnerability and 
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undeserved victimisation by others. The latter correspond to a specific self-
focussed attentional style (i.e. public self-consciousness) characterising pre-
existing cognitive vulnerability contributing towards clinical delusions 
formation and maintenance (Bentall et al., 2001; Freeman et al., 2002; 
Freeman et al., 2007). 
The null findings concerning the prediction of PEPS from the remaining (trait 
and state) measures may be due to low levels of power. In this study, the 
percentage of participants reporting a paranoia experience episode over the 
last 2 weeks was 21%. This finding contrasts the results from the PEPS’ 
original validation paper, where a more balanced sample of positive vs. 
negative cases (i.e. with N = 324, the proportion of ‘yes’ responses to the 
PEPS was 47%) was obtained. However, unlike Ellett et al.’s (2003) 
investigation, which covered a longer time period (i.e. presence/absence of 
paranoid experiences was recorded if participants ‘had ever had’ such 
experiences), the current study was the first to employ a much shorter 
timeframe of 2 weeks in which to record a personal experience of paranoia. 
This shorter timeframe may therefore account for the imbalanced number of 
PEPS ‘positive cases’ or ‘events’ characterising this student sample. This 
imbalance may have affected the validity and precision of regression 
coefficients in the logistic models, leading to biased parameter estimates and 
invalid significance tests (Peduzzi, Concato, Kemper, Holford, & Feinstein, 
1996), and potentially resulting in null findings.  
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In line with theory and empirical work, the fact that rumination and 
mindfulness (both trait and state) did not significantly predict the PEPS may 
suggests that, unlike public self-consciousness, these cognitive processes are 
subsequent to rather than antecedents of distressing threat beliefs (Bentall et 
al., 2001; Chadwick, 2006; Freeman et al., 2002; Freeman et al., 2007; 
Martinelli et al., 2013; Melo & Bentall, 2010; Vilardaga et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that whilst avoidant-type responses 
(e.g. rumination) to paranoid experiences (as measured by the PEPS) are 
more characteristic of clinical populations, nonclinical groups rely more on 
‘confronting’ reactions (e.g. directly seeking to discuss one’s concerns with 
their perceived persecutor) to such experiences (da Motta et al., 2014). Thus, 
‘confronting the situation’ appears to be a strategy regularly used by healthy 
individuals in an attempt to minimise the impact of distressing paranoid 
experiences (da Motta et al., 2014). This ‘confronting’ style of reacting also 
seems to be clearly distinguishable from the ability to relate with distressing 
experiences in a decentred, non-evaluative and accepting manner (Chadwick, 
2006). Although analysis of responses (including cognitive reactions) to 
paranoid experiences as measured by the PEPS was beyond the scope of 
this study, it is possible that rumination and mindfulness are not the type of 
cognitive strategies on which students usually rely as a way of dealing with 
these distressing experiences. 
Notwithstanding the above considerations regarding the prediction of PEPS’ 
null findings, it is worth noting that one result closely reached statistical 
significance. This was the case of the prediction of PEPS from state 
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mindfulness (p value of .06), thus potentially indicating a trend characterised 
by increased endorsement of personal paranoid experiences occurring over 
brief periods of time among individuals who are less able to respond to these 
distressing experiences with mindful awareness and acceptance. Such trend 
would be consistent with theory and emerging evidence linking increased 
psychotic-related distress with decreased mindfulness abilities, and vice-versa 
(Chadwick, 2006; Oliver et al., 2012b; Vilardaga et al., 2013).  
Future research investigating personal experiences of paranoia may benefit 
from using a combination of clinical and nonclinical samples and compare 
data from each group in terms of the cross-sectional and predictive 
relationship between these idiosyncratic experiences and the three above-
mentioned cognitive factors. This approach will help establishing whether the 
prediction of PEPS from public self-consciousness can be replicated in a 
clinical sample. This strategy will also allow testing the unique vs. cumulative 
contribution of public self-consciousness to paranoid experiences over and 
above rumination and mindfulness in clinical populations.  
 
Even though further examination of different dimensions of paranoia was 
beyond the scope of this study, descriptive analysis of the PEPS revealed the 
majority of individuals who endorsed a paranoid experience expressed there 
had be no change in their beliefs over the 2-week period. This finding is 
consistent with previous nonclinical research suggesting belief conviction 
tends to remain unchanged over time (Ellett et al., 2003). Furthermore, recent 
evidence also suggests healthy individuals do not differ from clinical groups 
regarding their degree of belief conviction (da Motta et al., 2014), and the 
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higher the belief conviction among nonclinical samples, the more detrimental 
the behavioural and emotional consequences of paranoid ideation (Moritz & 
van Quaquebeke, 2014). Therefore, future naturalistic prospective research 
should also consider examining the extent to which different dimensions of 
paranoid experiences as measured by the PEPS (e.g. preoccupation, 
powerlessness, conviction) may vary in intensity over time and the extent to 
which such variability may predict cognitive, behavioural and/or emotional 
responding to such distressing experiences. 
 
4.3. Strengths and limitations 
The next section will consider the strengths and limitations of the current 
research. 
4.3.1. Design  
To investigate the association between trait measures at baseline, the study 
employed a cross-sectional design. This strategy was deemed appropriate in 
that it allowed for the simultaneous examination of several variables. 
However, the use of a cross-sectional design means that causal links 
between these variables cannot be inferred and caution is warranted when 
interpreting these data.  
This study also used a naturalistic prospective design to examine the 
temporal association between paranoia and the three cognitive factors. This 
strategy is not only more ecologically valid but also permits more substantial 
inferences of causality. Furthermore, the use of a prospective design fits in 
with recent recommendations for further research to include examination of 
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the impact of different factors (including cognitive regulation strategies) on 
future expression of psychotic-like experiences (Collip et al., 2013b).  
However, there are also some limitations. First, the 2-week period may have 
been too short a timeframe for a more meaningful proportion of ‘PEPS 
positive cases’ to be found in this nonclinical sample (see section 4.2.3. 
above). As specified earlier, this resulted in an imbalanced number of 
cases/events per variable analysed, which consequently may have affected 
the validity of the logistic models (Pedduzi et al., 1996).  
Second, in this study ‘variability’ in the cognitive processes under examination 
may not have been adequately captured as it only relied on three 
measurement time-points over 2 weeks. It is plausible that multiple 
assessments (e.g. daily measures) of these variables could have resulted in 
more valid and reliable variability measures, However, this is unlikely as the 
same variability assessment strategy (i.e. three measurement time points) has 
been adopted by naturalistic prospective research showing a significant 
association between paranoid states and variability in cognitive processes 
(i.e. self-esteem) over time (Thewissen et al., 2007). 
4.3.2. Sample 
The total number of participants recruited in this study slightly exceeded the 
sample size recommended by the power analysis calculations. This suggests 
the sample used was sufficiently powered to enable detection of significant 
effects, whilst reducing the likelihood of a Type II error.  
However, the sampling strategy also presents key limitations. These include 
the use of a convenience sample, which in spite of its cost and accessibility 
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advantages it may also limit the generalisability of the findings. Using student 
samples may also result in an overestimation of the level of delusional beliefs 
compared with samples drawn from the general population, thus also limiting 
the generalisability of findings (Lincoln & Keller, 2008). However, in the 
current study the mean levels of paranoia as measured by the PS (i.e. a 
measure of trait paranoia specifically designed for use with student 
populations) were consistent with prior nonclinical research (e.g. Ellett et al., 
2003; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). Furthermore, the overall findings 
regarding the study hypotheses are also consistent with other prospective 
studies using a range of samples (e.g. Brett et al., 2014; Kramer et al., 2013; 
Thewissen et al., 2011), which supports generalisability of the current 
findings. 
 
Attention should also be drawn to the fact that the sample was predominantly 
female, University educated (i.e. undergraduate and postgraduate levels), the 
majority of which considered themselves as being of White ethnic 
backgrounds. Therefore, the sample demographics may also limit the 
generalisability of the findings.  
 
4.3.3. One-tailed hypothesis testing 
 
As specified earlier (see section 1.5.2. above, p. 51), the study tested five 
hypotheses, two of which were directional (H1 and H4) whereas the remaining 
three were non-directional (H2, H3 and H5). Formulation of directional 
hypotheses was deemed appropriate given the strong, prior theoretical 
framework (i.e. see section 1.3. above), which underlies expectations about 
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the direction of effects (i.e. positive and negative correlations between trait 
paranoia, the three cognitive factors and problem behaviour at baseline as 
stated in H1, and the prediction of PEPS from trait paranoia and the three 
cognitive factors as stated in H4). When testing these directional hypotheses, 
one-tailed significance levels were applied. Although this approach has the 
potential to increase power to detect a significant effect, it constitutes a key 
limitation of the study in that it may have led to increased type I error rates 
(Sapp, 2006). However, the latter is unlikely given that the findings of the 
abovementioned directional hypotheses remained statistically significant even 
when more conservative two-tailed significance levels were applied. 
 
4.3.4. Measures 
The data collected for the current study were based on self-report measures, 
which are known to be vulnerable to informant bias (e.g. social desirability) 
and method error (e.g. item-wording and scaling interpretation). However, all 
measures were carefully chosen in light of their robust psychometric 
properties, and the study findings were in the expected direction and 
consistent with prior theory and empirical work. Furthermore, self-report 
measures are also advantageous in that they enable large quantities of data 
to be collected within short periods of time, are cost-effective, minimise 
possibility of experimenter bias, and provide anonymised information, which 
can be quickly quantified and objectively analysed.   
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However, between the four state measures, assessment of cognitive states 
relied on different timeframes. That is, whereas state paranoia and self-
awareness measures captured ‘in the moment’/’right now’ paranoid and self-
aware states, the state rumination measure captured ‘daily’ ruminative states 
and the state mindfulness measure captured mindful states experienced 
‘within the last 2 days’. This may have potentially compromised the validity of 
momentary data, as the different state measures may have been susceptible 
to varying levels of recall accuracy (Oorschot et al., 2009). Ideally, the 
timeframes for all state measures would have relied on ‘the here and now’ 
ratings to minimise recall bias. However, more suitable alternative state 
measures of mindfulness and rumination were unavailable at the time of 
planning the research and during the completion of the study.  
 
Nevertheless, a key strength of this study was the use of a naturalistic 
approach to assess state paranoia and the cognitive processes of public self-
awareness, rumination and mindfulness. By asking participants to complete 
the state measures in their own environment, the data obtained has higher 
ecological validity than more traditional cross-sectional and prospective 
research methods (Myin-Germeys et al., 2009). The use of state measures in 
the current study also contrasts the type of momentary assessments often 
used in other prospective research employing naturalistic methodologies, 
such as ESM-based studies. In the latter, momentary assessments usually 
rely on very narrow definitions of the constructs measured (i.e. single ESM 
question items) so unable to cover a fuller range of possible dimensions 
operationalising constructs of interest (Ben-Zeev, Ellington, Swendsen, & 
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Granholm, 2011). This is an important limitation as cognitive processes are 
fleeting in nature so especially difficult to capture as they occur (Ben-Zeev et 
al., 2012). Therefore it is important that underlying the momentary 
assessment of such processes are measures that can more fully capture their 
defining features something which this study was able to do, by using state 
measures of the variables of interest. 
 
Another key strength of the current study is the use of the PEPS (Ellett et al., 
2003), as it emphasises the idiosyncratic nature of paranoid experiences 
rather than relying on paranoia measures which employ pre-defined/standard 
and/or broader definitions of this construct only (see section 4.2.3. above). 
However, endorsement of paranoid experiences over the 2-week period could 
have been the result of ‘real’ events as opposed to unfounded beliefs, so 
potentially defying more traditional conceptualisations of paranoia 
emphasising ‘falsity’ or ‘false beliefs’ as its key defining feature (Freeman, 
2008). Nevertheless, the definition of a ‘paranoid experience’ provided by the 
PEPS is consistent with advocates of the continuum view, who describe 
paranoia as the perception of/belief about planned and intentional harm by 
others (Ellett et al., 2003; Freeman & Garety, 2000).  By including “a clear 
perception of intended harm” (Ellett et al., 2003, p.427), the PEPS definition of 
paranoid experiences also ensures its distinctiveness from social anxiety, an 
important conceptual differentiation given the considerable overlap between 
both conditions (Freeman & Garety, 2000). 
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An additional issue that warrants some discussion relates to the fact that 
affective variables were not measured and examined in relation to this study’s 
main constructs (i.e. paranoia, public self-consciousness, rumination and 
mindfulness). This is a significant limitation in light of theory and extensive 
empirical work suggesting the prominent role of emotion in the development 
and maintenance of persecutory delusions (e.g. Ben-Zeev et al., 2011, 
Freeman et al., 2002; Freeman et al., 2007; Myin-Germeys et al., 2009; 
Smith, Fowler, Freeman, Bebbington, Bashforth, Garety, et al., 2006). In fact, 
cognitive models propose that in the context of anomalous experiences (e.g. 
threat beliefs) and stressful events, emotional changes occur, which impact 
the moment-to-moment cognitive processing of such experiences, influencing 
their content and perpetuating their occurrence (e.g. through rumination) 
(Freeman et al., 2002; Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 
2001).  
 
The above mentioned theoretical accounts are supported by evidence 
showing that the link between persecutory ideation and a range of cognitive 
processes (e.g. hyperalertness and negative ideas about the self) is partially 
explained by anxiety and depression (Freeman et al., 2012) and negative 
affect is a significant predictor (rather than a consequence) of delusional 
thinking (Fowler, Hodgekins, Garety, Freeman, Kuipers, Dunn, et al., 2011; 
Freeman et al., 2011). Research has also consistently identified depression 
as a strong correlate and predictor of paranoia (e.g. Freeman et al., 2011; 
Freeman et al., 2012; Hartley, Barrowclough, & Haddock, 2013), and more 
recently, depression has also been found to associate with state paranoia and 
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other cognitive correlates of current paranoid thinking (e.g. anticipation of 
threat to the self, negative interpretations of ambiguous events and negative 
ideas about the self) (Freeman et al., 2013). Furthermore, when examining 
the correlates and predictors of paranoia in the context of daily life, naturalistic 
prospective research has also identified depression as a key factor 
contributing towards the persistence of moment-to-moment paranoid thinking 
(Kramer et al., 2013) and a predictor of distress following prior persecutory 
ideation (Ben-Zeev et al., 2011). Compared to previous research and given 
their powerful repeated measures methodology, these naturalistic prospective 
studies provide a stronger test of the directionality of the association between 
depression and paranoia and the extent to which depressive mood may 
interact with other cognitive processes which are also likely to impact current 
paranoid thinking.  
 
In light of the considerations above, it is therefore plausible that affective 
processes (and depressive mood in particular), which were not accounted for 
in the current study, could potentially have more explanatory power in relation 
to the hypothesized relationships and mechanisms of influence between 
paranoia and the cognitive factors under examination. In fact, the potential for 
depression to impact nonclinical paranoia via its interaction with the three 
cognitive factors measured in this study is of particular interest given the 
already known associations between depressed mood, high levels of self-
consciousness and rumination, and low mindful abilities in the context of 
persecutory delusions (e.g. Freeman et al., 2013; Startup et al., 2007; White, 
Gumley, McTaggart, Rattrie, McConville, & Cleare, 2013). Future research 
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would therefore benefit from pursuing this line of inquiry as the role of 
depression in contributing towards formation and maintenance of paranoia, 
over and above other cognitive processes relevant to paranoid thinking 
remains currently unknown.  
 
4.4. Clinical implications 
 
Consistent with the continuum view (e.g. Freeman et al., 2005), the current 
study showed that paranoid cognitions are commonly experienced in 
nonclinical populations and key cognitive correlates and predictors of such 
experiences have also been found to associate with clinical manifestations of 
paranoia. A direct clinical implication of these findings concerns the 
normalisation of paranoid experiences. Normalising paranoia is an important 
aspect of therapeutic work in that it can encourage individuals to share their 
experiences (which, at the cognitive level, may include their focus of attention, 
and ruminative and/or mindful responses), which may in turn help minimise 
the distress related to their symptoms (Turkington, Kingdon, Rathod, 
Hammond, Pelton, & Mehta, 2006).  
Clinical implications can also be derived from the contribution of public self-
consciousness to subsequent paranoid experiences. Keeping in mind the 
continuum view, a possible extrapolation of this finding to individuals 
presenting with clinical delusions is that prompt identification and ongoing 
monitoring of self-focussed attentional processes, should be an integral part 
of standard approaches to assessment, formulation and treatment of 
psychotic disorders. This is especially relevant when considering evidence 
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that ‘attentional processing’ (i.e. self-consciousness) in clinical paranoia is 
fluid over time, moving between an exaggerated focus on the self (as the 
target of external threat) and others (as the source of malicious intent) (Stopa 
et al., 2013). Therefore, careful examination of self-conscious processes may 
benefit from using personal account-based measures such as the PEPS, as 
these methods provide rich and detailed descriptions of thoughts/perceptions 
of harm underlying paranoid experiences. Such approaches to measurement 
are seldom used in routine clinical practice (Stopa et al., 2013), which 
potentially explains why most treatments offered to psychotic populations are 
psychopharmacological in nature, rather than based on a formulation-based 
understanding of psychological processes contributing to psychosis-related 
symptoms (Vilardaga et al., 2013). 
Public self-consciousness may also constitute a key target for change earlier 
in the treatment process. Addressing change in this exaggerated self-
focussed attentional style is already a fundamental aspect of traditional CBT 
approaches, which emphasise thought challenging, generating alternative 
explanations for internal and/or external events and reality-testing (Freeman 
et al., 2012). However, and consistent with a formulation-based approach to 
treatment, prior to promoting change the role of psycho-education in helping 
clients understand the link between public self-consciousness and paranoid 
thinking is key in this process. By raising awareness about the type of 
cognitions that characterise a public self-conscious attentional style, 
individuals may feel more empowered in their ability to independently 
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recognise and monitor these ways of thinking and the extent to which these 
cognitive processes contribute to their paranoid beliefs over time.     
The current study also suggests that self-consciousness operates together 
with other maladaptive cognitive processes such as ruminative thinking and 
non-mindful coping to maintain paranoid thinking. Therefore, shifting 
attentional focus coupled with the learning of more adaptive cognitive coping 
strategies is likely to be a crucial target of successful clinical interventions. In 
this sense, an integrative approach to psychosis intervention combining 
elements of traditional CBT (e.g. thought challenging and testing out paranoid 
ideas) with third wave approaches such as Mindfulness-based programmes 
(e.g. Chadwick et al., 2009) and ACT (Hayes et al., 1999) could potentially 
increase treatment effectiveness. In fact, there is emerging evidence attesting 
the clinical benefits of applying Mindfulness approaches and ACT to the 
treatment of psychotic individuals (e.g. Bach & Hayes, 2002; Bach, Hayes, & 
Gallop, 2012; Chadwick et al., 2005; Chadwick et al., 2009). Common to both 
approaches is the emphasis placed on changing one’s relationship with their 
symptoms rather than focusing on the symptoms themselves, and draw on 
mindfulness abilities (through learning and/or regular practice) to directly 
address unhelpful cognitive coping in the form of rumination, avoidance 
and/or judgemental appraisals of internal/external experiences (Bach, 
Gaudiano, Pankey, Herbert, & Hayes, 2006; Chadwick, 2006). This shift in 
treatment focus is also consistent with the observation that although paranoia 
is common among healthy individuals, one of the possible reasons as to why 
the vast majority do not go on to develop clinical psychopathology, is their 
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increased tendency to respond to these experiences in more adaptive/helpful 
ways (Lincoln et al., 2010). Findings from the current study also seem to 
support this view.  
Clinical implications can also be tentatively derived from the correlational 
evidence obtained in this study of an association between paranoia and a 
range of maladaptive behaviours. Besides characterising several 
psychological disorders (Kingston et al., 2011; Wuppermann et al., 2012), 
behavioural dysregulation in the form of co-occurring problem behaviours 
such as substance misuse and aggression appears to be a key feature of 
emotional regulation deficits underlying paranoia in both clinical and 
nonclinical samples (e.g. Lincoln et al., 2010; Lincoln et al., 2014). In the 
current study, findings only suggest that, rather than being a cause or a 
consequence of paranoid thinking, diverse problem behaviours co-occur with 
paranoia. However, in addition to the evidence above, this finding potentially 
highlights the relevance of accounting for behavioural dysregulation as a 
comorbid feature of paranoia in clinical settings. By incorporating this 
information as part of the formulation process, this may in turn guide the 
development and implementation or individualised/tailored interventions 
specifically designed to target such comorbidity. As previously suggested, 
effective interventions in this area are likely to be transdiagnostic in nature 
(e.g. including Mindfulness and/or ACT-based approaches), which target 
change in common processes underlying both paranoia and problem 
behaviours such as emotional regulation deficits and experiential avoidance 
(Kingston et al., 2010; Lincoln et al., 2014; Wuppermann et al., 2012). 
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4.5. Conclusion 
 
 The current study addressed theoretical and methodological gaps in the 
literature concerning the correlates and predictors of nonclinical paranoia. The 
following key findings emerged: (1) higher trait paranoia was associated with 
higher trait public self-consciousness and rumination, and with lower trait 
mindfulness; (2) higher trait paranoia is associated with a global measure of 
problem behaviour; (3) trait paranoia predicted variability in state paranoia 
over the course of 2 weeks; (4) an association was found between three 
random time samples of state paranoia, public self-awareness, rumination 
(positive correlations) and mindfulness (negative correlation) over the 2-week 
period, and (5) trait public self-consciousness predicted endorsement of 
paranoid experiences as measured by the PEPS (Ellett et al., 2003) at the 
end of 2 weeks. Collectively, the current findings support contemporary 
models of delusion formation and maintenance (Chadwick, 2006; Freeman et 
al., 2002), and provide a foundation for further research into the dynamic 
interplay between cognitive processes contributing towards the onset and/or 
persistence of paranoid thinking.    
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1: STUDY FLYER 
 
Enter a prize draw (vouchers worth £100 total!) by taking part in psychology 
study 
A research study is currently ongoing at the Clinical Psychology Department focusing 
on thoughts, feelings and experiences among University students. By taking part in 
this study, participants will be entered into a prize draw for vouchers worth a total of 
£100! 
This study is open to all RHUL students (undergraduate and postgraduate). 
If you are interested in taking part, please contact: 
Carla.Matias.2012@live.rhul.ac.uk 
 
If you are a member of the Psychology Experiment Management System, you can also 
check the study details there (see listings under the paid pool only), and book in a time 
slot to participate in the study. 
 
Thank you! 
 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the  
Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee,  
Royal Holloway University London 
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APPENDIX 2: BASELINE MEASURES (STAGE 1) 

 
Before completing the questionnaires below, please make sure you enter you 
research participation ID number.
Your research participation ID No: 
_____________________________________ 
 

Socio-demographic questionnaire  
 
 
Please provide the following information: 
 
 
1. Please state your age  
 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
2. Your gender (circle chosen option): 
 
Male     Female     Transgender    
Other, please specify________________________________________________ 
 
 
3. Your ethnicity (circle chosen option): 
 
White British     White Other     Black British     Black Other     Asian British     Asian 
Other
Other, please specify___________________________________________ 
 
 
4. Course/degree title & year ___________________________________________ 
 
 
5. Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental health problem? (circle chosen 
option) 
 
Yes    No 
 
The following questions ask you about your previous knowledge and/or 
experience of mindfulness. 
 
 
Mindfulness is a form of meditation, which has increasingly been taught and 
practiced in the West but has its roots in Eastern (Buddhist) philosophy.
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6. Have you ever learnt/been taught about mindfulness? (circle chosen option) 
 
Yes    No 
 
 
7. Have you ever practiced any form of mindfulness-based technique (e.g. mindful 
meditation)? (circle chosen option) 
 
Yes     No 
 
 
Continue to questions 8-10 below if answering 'YES' to question 7 above. 
 
 
8. Please indicate the type of mindfulness-based technique(s) you have practiced 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
9. Please indicate how long have you been practicing mindfulness?  
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
10. What is your competence level in mindfulness practice (e.g. beginner, 
intermediate, advanced?) 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Thank you for filling in this questionnaire. 
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 Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006) 

Please read each statement below and tick the box that indicates how applicable each 
statement is to you. 
 




















 








 





 















    



    



    



    



    



    


    


    



    


    



    



    



    



    




    


    


    


    


    
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

    


    


    



    


    
     


    


    



    


    
     
     
 
 
 Thank you for filling in this questionnaire. 
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The Paranoia Scale (PS; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) 

Please read each statement below and tick the box that indicates how applicable each 
statement is to you. It is usually your initial response that is most accurate so please do not 
spend a long time considering each item.
 









































































    



    



    



    



    



    


    



    




    


    



    



    



    



    



    



    



    


    
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


    



    
 
 Thank you for filling in this questionnaire. 
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 The Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS; Fenigstein et al., 1975) 

Below are statements that may or may not be characteristics of the way you see yourself as a 
person. Read each carefully and rate whether the statement is characteristic or 
uncharacteristic of you ticking the box that indicates how applicable each statement is to you.
 














 



























































    


    


    



    


    


    


    


    


    


    


    


    


    


    


    


    



    



    


    
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     
     


    
     
  
 Thank you for filling in this questionnaire. 


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
 The Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ; Ehring et al., 2011) 
 
In this questionnaire, you will be asked to describe how you typically think about negative 
experiences or problems. Please read the following statements and rate the extent to which 
they apply to you when you think about negative experiences or problems. 
 





 
























    


    


    


    


    


    


    


    


    


    


    


    


    


    


    
 
 
 
  Thank you for filling in this questionnaire. 
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 The Composite Measure of Problem Behavior (CMPB; Kingston et al., 
2011) 

This questionnaire is designed to ask you about a range of behaviours that you may, or may 
not, engage in. You are required to rate the extent to which each statement below 
characterises you, using the following scale: 
 1 - - - - - - - -       2 - - - - - - - -      3 - - - - - - - -     4 - - - - - - - -     5 - - - - - -      6 -------------- 
Very unlike me  Quite unlike me  A little unlike me  A little like me  Quite like me  Very Like me 
For example, if you read a statement and think “it’s very unlike me to do X” you would circle 
option “1” for that statement. If you think “that’s only very slightly like me” circle option ‘4’, or if 
you think “it’s very like me to do that”, circle option ‘6’. 
Before completing the questionnaire, please take note of the following points: 
Where questions refer to internet use, this means non-work related use such as chat rooms, 
surfing the net etc. Where questions refer to sexual behaviours, this includes both foreplay 
and all forms of sexual intercourse. Where questions refer to drugs, this means the use of 
illegal drugs. This would include, for example, Cannabis, Cocaine, Ecstasy etc. Where 
questions refer to smoking, this means tobacco. 
Please read each statement below carefully and answer as honestly as possible. All 
answers are anonymous. Please do not leave any answers blank. 
It's like me to .... 
1 say no to drugs (this includes cannabis)                                               1     2     3     4     5     6 
2 be pre-occupied by thoughts about smoking when  
smoking is prohibited                   1     2     3     4     5     6 
 
3 sometimes consume more than 6 alcoholic drinks in one evening      1     2     3     4     5     6 
4 ignore dietary details (e.g., calorie content) when  
choosing something to eat              1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
5 exercise even when I am feeling tired and/or unwell                           1     2     3     4     5     6 
6 sometimes intentionally prevent scars or wounds  
from healing                                    1     2     3     4     5     6 
 
7 smoke tobacco                                                                                       1     2     3     4     5     6 
8 surf the net/play computer games before doing something  
else that needs doing               1    2     3     4     5     6 
 
9 generally have no interest in taking drugs (this  
includes cannabis)                              1     2    3     4     5     6 
 
10 sometimes engage in sexual activities with someone I have  
only just met                    1     2     3     4     5     6 
 
11 find that my work performance or productivity suffers because  
of my internet/video game use.                                                                1     2     3     4     5     6 
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12 never resort to violence.                                                                      1     2     3     4     5     6 
13 sometimes actively seek out drugs for personal use                           1     2     3     4     5     6 
(this includes cannabis). 
 
14 feel irritation/frustration if I am in a non-smoking environment.       1     2     3     4     5     6 
15 sometimes scratch or bite myself to the point of  
scarring or bleeding.                       1     2     3     4     5     6 
 
16 sometimes feel pre-occupied with the internet/ 
computer games.                              1     2     3     4     5     6 
 
17 skip doing exercise for no good reason.                                              1     2     3     4     5    6 
18 drink a lot more alcohol than I initially intended.                               1     2     3     4     5     6 
19 have a long list of things that I dare not eat.            1     2     3     4     5     6 
20 feel excitement and/or tension in anticipation of  
getting drunk.                                  1     2     3     4     5     6 
 
21 be content if I am prevented from exercising for a week.                   1     2     3     4     5    6 
22 always stop eating when I feel full.                                                     1     2     3     4     5    6 
23 prefer being in places where smoking is prohibited.                           1     2     3     4     5    6 
24 control my temper.                                                                               1     2     3     4     5    6 
25 deliberately take small helpings as a means of controlling  
my weight.                         1     2     3     4     5     6 
 
26 exercise more than three times a week.                                               1     2     3     4     5    6 
27 sometimes eat to the point of physical discomfort.                             1     2     3     4     5    6 
28 sometimes feel tension and/or excitement in anticipation of              1     2     3     4     5    6 
doing exercise.  
 
29 sometimes cause myself direct bodily harm by, for example,  
cutting or burning myself.                                                                        1     2     3     4     5    6 
 
30 only eat when I am hungry.                                                                 1     2     3     4     5    6 
31 unsuccessfully try to cut back my use of the internet/ 
computer games                        1     2     3     4     5     6 
 
32 be excited by the opportunity of taking drugs  
(this includes cannabis)                       1     2     3     4     5     6 
 
33 sometimes get so angry that I break something                                 1     2     3     4     5     6 
34 sometimes have more than one sexual partner.                                   1    2     3     4     5     6 
35 sometimes engage in sexual actives with someone when I 
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really shouldn't                               1     2     3     4     5    6  
 
36 easily limit my use of the internet or video games                              1     2     3     4     5    6 
37 feel the urge to have a cigarette.                                                          1     2     3     4     5    6 
38 sometimes feel that I need to take drugs  
(this includes cannabis)                           1     2     3     4     5    6 
 
39 go out with friends who are drinking, but opt to stay sober                1     2     3     4     5    6 
40 sometimes think that I might have a drugs problem                            1     2     3     4     5    6 
(this includes cannabis).  
 
41 avoid eating when I am hungry                                                           1     2     3     4     5   6 
42 find it difficult to stop eating after certain foods                                 1     2     3     4     5   6 
43 be aggressive when sufficiently provoked                                           1     2     3     4     5   6 
44 feel the urge to intentionally harm myself                                           1     2     3     4     5    6 
45 sometimes feel that I need an alcoholic drink                                      1     2     3     4     5    6 
46 sometimes claim I have already eaten when this is not true                1     2     3     4     5    6 
  
 Thank you for filling in this questionnaire. 
 
 
 
You have now completed all 6 baseline questionnaires for STAGE 1 of the 
study. Please ask the researcher for details regarding completion of  
STAGES 2 and 3.  
 
Thank you. 
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APPENDIX 3: STATE MEASURES (STAGE 2) 

Before completing the questionnaires below:
1. please make sure you enter you research participation ID number.
Your research participation ID No: _____________________________________
 
 
2. please indicate the date and time when you finish completing this 
questionnaire pack. 
 
 
Date:  ____/_______/_______      Time:  
 



 





 



 





 
















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 The Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory – 14-item short version (FMI-14; 
Walach et al., 2006) 
 
Please use the last 2 days as the time-frame to consider each item below. Provide an 
answer for every statement as best you can. Please answer as honestly and spontaneously 
as possible. There are neither ‘right’ nor ‘wrong’ answers, nor ‘good’ or ‘bad’ responses. 
What is important to us is your own personal experience.  



























   


   



   


   


   


   


   


   


   


   



   



   



   
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The Paranoia & Depression Scale (PDS; Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998) 

Please answer each question below by ticking the box that corresponds to how much  
you agree each statement describes your thoughts and feelings right now.
 
 
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1. I believe that my behaviour is being analysed. 
 
      
2. I feel that people talk about me. 
 
      
3. I feel that people are hostile to me.  
 
      
4. I feel that others are picking on me. 
 
      
5. I feel that others are examining my actions. 
 
      
6. I feel that others influence my performance. 
 
      
7. I do not trust people’s intentions. 
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The Situational Self-Awareness Scale (SSAS; Govern & Marsch, 2001) 

Please respond to each statement below based on how you feel RIGHT NOW, AT THIS 
INSTANT (not how you feel in general, or at this point in your life). Tick the box with the  
number that corresponds to your answer. There are no “right” or “wrong” answers. 
 

                  Strongly Disagree           Strongly Agree 
 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
1. RIGHT NOW, I am keenly aware of 
everything in my environment. 
 
       
2. RIGHT NOW, I am conscious of my 
inner feelings. 
 
       
3. RIGHT NOW, I am concerned about the 
way I present myself. 
 
       
4. RIGHT NOW, I’m self-conscious about 
the way I look. 
 
       
5. RIGHT NOW, I am conscious of what is 
going on around me. 
 
       
6. RIGHT NOW, I am reflective about my 
life. 
 
       
7. RIGHT NOW, I am concerned about 
what other people think of me. 
 
       
8. RIGHT NOW, I am aware of my 
innermost thoughts. 
 
       
9. RIGHT NOW, I am conscious of all 
objects around me. 
 
       














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The Ruminative Styles Questionnaire – state version (RSQ-s; Ciesla et 
al., 2012) 

Using the scale below, please indicate how frequently have you done each of the following 
today: 
 
(0) Not at all 
(1) Occasionally 
(2) Often 
(3) All the time 
  
 
1.      Thought “Why do I always react this way?”                             0         1           2           3 
 
2.      Thought “What am I doing to deserve this?”                           0         1           2           3 
 
3.      Thought “Why do I have problems other people                              0         1           2           3 
  don’t have?” 
 
4.      Thought “Why can’t I handle things better?”                                    0         1           2           3 
 
5.      Analyzed recent events to try to understand your                            0         1           2           3 
  feelings 
 
6.     Went away by yourself and thought about why you                          0          1          2           3 
  felt how you did 
 
7.     Wrote down what you are thinking and analyzed it                           0           1          2          3 
 
8.      Analyzed your personality to try to understand why                         0           1          2          3 
  you are depressed 
 
9.      Tried to understand yourself by focusing on your                             0           1          2          3 
  depressed feelings 
 
10.   Thought about how sad you feel                                                        0           1          2          3 
 
11.   Isolated yourself and thought about the reason you                          0           1          2          3 
  feel sad 
 
12.   Thought about all your shortcomings, faults, and mistakes               0           1          2          3 
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APPENDIX 4: FOLLOW-UP MEASURE (STAGE 3) 


Personal Experiences of Paranoia Scale (PEPS; Ellett et al., 2003) 
 
Before completing this questionnaire, please make sure you enter you research 
participation ID number.
Your research participation ID No:___________________________________ 
 
-----//--------- 
 
Research has shown it is normal to believe that sometimes people are deliberately trying to 
harm or upset you, or are working together against you. For example, when you unexpectedly 
get a lower mark in an exam, you may think that the examiner doesn’t like you and therefore 
deliberately gave you a low mark. Or alternatively, you may believe that others are trying to 
harm or upset you by deliberately excluding or rejecting you. 
 
Please state whether in the last 2 weeks you had a feeling that people were deliberately 
trying to harm or upset you in some way? (Please circle the appropriate response)  
 
Yes  /   No 
 
If replying YES to question 1 above, please answer the following questions: 
 
2. Please describe an example of the situation where you felt someone deliberately trying to 
harm/upset you. 
 
 
3. In the above situation that you have described, at that time did you feel that the other 
people involved actively intended to harm you? (Please circle the appropriate response) 
 
Yes    /    No 
 
4. In the situation that you have described, how much did you feel that you were: 
  
Judged negatively by others 
 
1 (Not at all)        2        3        4        5 (Very much)  
 
 
Blocked from achieving your goals 
 
1 (Not at all)        2        3        4        5 (Very much)   
 
 
Powerless to stop what was being done to you 
 
1 (Not at all)        2        3        4        5 (Very much) 
 
 
5. What was the main emotion that you felt?  
 
 
 
6. What other feelings did you experience?  
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7. At the time, why do you think this event happened?  
 
 
 
8. What did you do about this situation? Please describe the actions taken.  
 
 
 
9. What did you want to do? 
 
 
 
10. How much did this feeling preoccupy you at the time? 
 
1 (Not at all)       2        3        4        5 (Very much)  
 
 
11. How many times over the past 2 weeks have you had this type of feeling?  
 
 
12. How much impact did this experience have on your wellbeing?  
 
1 (None at all)       2        3       4       5 (Severe) 
 
 
13. Was this feeling preceded by negative moods, such as sadness and worry?  
 
Yes   /   No 
 
 
14. How much did you believe that you deserved this mistreatment? 
 
           1                                 2                             3                    4                              5 
Totally undeserved  Somewhat undeserved   Unsure  Somewhat deserved   Totally deserved 
 
 
15. At the present moment, has there been any change in your beliefs?  
 
Yes   /    No  
 
If yes, please specify. 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. 
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APPENDIX 5: SCRIPT FOR STUDY PARTICIPANTS (FIRST MEETING) 
 
Hello, my name is Carla, nice to meet you. Can I just check with you you’re here to 
find out more about a study focusing on thoughts, feelings and experiences in 
university students? Also, can you please confirm how did you find out about the 
study? Ok. The purpose of our meeting today is to give you a brief overview of the 
study, what is involved should you chose to participate, and to answer any additional 
questions you may have. I will also be giving you an information sheet, which 
summarises in detail our conversation today. At the end of our meeting, you are 
welcome to go through the information sheet, after which I will ask you if you’re 
happy with the information I have provided and I will answer any outstanding queries 
you may have. I will then ask you if you would like to participate, and you are free to 
say ‘no’ as participation in the study is voluntary. If you chose to participate, you will 
need to sign a consent form.  Any questions so far? Ok. Now, I will explain the main 
procedures of the study. 
The study will focus on how thoughts, feelings, and individual experiences in 
students relate to one another over a 2-week period. This study therefore takes 
approximately 2-weeks to complete. 
Now I am going to tell you about the details of taking part. If you decide to take part 
in this study you will be asked to complete three stages of data collection. The data 
we will be collecting from you is questionnaire data. You will be asked to complete 
online questionnaires at the beginning and at the end of the two-week period. On 
three random occasions over the 2 weeks I will also be emailing you to prompt you to 
complete a set of short paper-based questionnaires. Therefore, if you agree to 
participate in this study you will need to provide me with your email address. To 
ensure confidentiality from the start, you will only be known by an ID number rather 
than by name, and your contact details will be safely stored before being deleted at 
the end of the study. Regarding your responses to our questionnaires, these will also 
be safely stored and can only be accessed by my supervisors and myself.  
Now I would like you to have a look at this flow chart [hand in flow chart to student]. 
According to this information, the three stages of the study can be summarized as 
follows: 
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Stage 1 begins today. You will be asked to complete a set of online questionnaires 
using a laptop/PC, which I will give you access to. You will need to complete the 
questionnaires all in one go. There are 6 questionnaires to this stage and it should 
take approximately 30 minutes to complete them all. If you chose to take part you will 
complete the questionnaires in this room whilst I wait for you to complete them in a 
separate room. Once you have completed the questionnaires you enter the next 
stage. 
To complete stage 2, and before we end our meeting today, I will give you 3 packs 
labeled ‘pack 1’, ‘pack 2, and ‘pack 3’, which contain a set of 4 brief questionnaires 
each. You will then take these 3 packs home with you and over the course of the 
next 2 weeks, I will send you 3 emails at different times and days. After receiving 
each of the 3 emails, you will need to complete the questionnaires in ‘pack 1’, ‘pack 
2’ and ‘pack 3’ all in one go, in the order they are presented, and within 3 hours of 
receiving the initial emails. In this stage, each set of questionnaires should take 
about 5mins to complete. Once you complete each set of questionnaires, please put 
them back in their respective packs, indicating the time and date you completed them 
in the front of the envelope provided. You will then need to bring the completed 
questionnaires to our second meeting at the Department of Clinical Psychology 
(Boywer Building) during which you will be completing stage 3 of the study.  
To complete stage 3, and before we end our meeting today, I will confirm with you 
the date of our second meeting here at the Bowyer Building. On this date, I will be 
meeting you to ask you to complete one final questionnaire online. You can do this 
by using one of the laptops/PCs available at our department. As before, I will wait in 
a separate room whilst you complete the online questionnaire. This will take about 
10-15mins to complete and once you do this I will debrief you about the study.  
Unless you are a first year psychology student (in which case you will be awarded a 
total of 4 course credits for your participation), you will be entered into a prize draw 
for vouchers worth a total of £100 (i.e. 2 vouchers of £25 each, 2 vouchers of £20 
each and 1 voucher worth £10). 
Do you have any questions about what I’ve just explained to you? [if ‘yes’ to this 
question, answer student’s further questions; if ‘no’ proceed as explained below] 
Ok, now that I have talked you through the study, I want to let you know that I will be 
carrying out this study under the supervision of Dr Kingston and Dr Ellett, from the 
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Clinical Psychology Department. Throughout the study, you’re welcome to get in 
contact with me if needed. Because I will be asking you about your thoughts, feelings 
and experiences, this could affect your mood, in which case you may wish to contact 
other sources of support such as the University Counselling Service. Although not 
everybody will need this type of support, we wanted to ensure you have this option, if 
you think you may benefit from it. You can find all the useful contact details in the 
information sheet. 
I have an information sheet to give you that reiterates everything I have told you so 
far. Before handing you the information sheet, I just would like to add that if you 
chose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any stage, this will not affect 
your studies in any way.   
[hand in info sheet] 
Ok, I will now give you a few mins for you to go through the information sheet. Please 
let me know when you’re finished and if there is anything you need me to clarify. 
[after student finishes with info sheet and has no further questions] 
Ok, now that you have had an opportunity to read the information sheet and get 
further clarification about the study, I would like to ask you whether you will be happy 
to participate.  
[if student says no]: Ok, that’s fine. Thank you so much for your time.  
[if student says yes]: Ok, thank you so much for agreeing to participate. Now, I just 
need you to read our consent form. After going through this information, you will 
need to check a few tick boxes, date and sign the form. I will also need you to give 
me your contact details in the form of your email address.  
[hand in consent form + pen]: ok, here is the consent form. Please have a read and 
let me know if you have any queries. If not, please complete the form and make sure 
you also include your email address.  
[after obtaining signed consent form + contact info]: Ok, thank you so much once 
again. I will now ask you to complete the first set of online questionnaires. The 
computer/laptop you will be using is the one available in this room. I will now open 
the web link for the questionnaires so you can complete them. When you access the 
questionnaires, there will be instructions for you to follow at each stage. However, if 
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you have any queries whilst completing the questionnaires just let me know and I will 
help you. You can find me in room XXX, where I’ll wait for you to tell me when you’re 
finished.  
Ok, now I will open the web link for you so you can access the questionnaires. 
[student accesses the questionnaires and is happy to continue] 
Ok, I will let you get on with it now. Remember, I’ll be in room XX in case you need 
any assistance. Otherwise, just let me know when you’re done. 
[student notifies researcher when he/she has finished the questionnaires] 
Thank you once again for completing the first set of questionnaires. 
As I’ve explained before, to complete stage 2, here are packs 1, 2 and 3 with sets of 
4 short questionnaires each [hand in packs to student]. In the next 2 weeks, I will 
email you on the email address you have provided at different times and days. After 
receiving each email, please remember to complete the questionnaires in each pack 
within the next 3 hours. Once you have all 3 packs completed you will need to bring 
them back to our next meeting. 
The date of our next meeting is XXX. As I’ve explained before, when meeting again, 
besides bringing your 3 packs back, you will also be completing one final 
questionnaire online, as we did today. Once you do this, you will be fully debriefed 
and compensated for your participation. 
Ok, so before you go today, is there anything about the study you need me to clarify? 
Is it clear what you need to do in the next 2 weeks? 
[clarify if student says ‘no’] 
[if student says ‘yes’:] 
Ok, brilliant. So I’ll see you again on XXX. Please keep the information sheet with 
you in case you have any further queries during the next two weeks. Thank you, bye.  
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APPENDIX 6: SCRIPT FOR STUDY PARTICIPANTS (SECOND 
MEETING) 
 
Hi again, and thank you for coming back. Before we proceed with stage 3 today, can 
I just ask you for the 3 packs I gave you at our first meeting? Did you manage to 
complete them all? Where there any difficulties with it? [clarify if student says ‘yes’]. 
Ok, now that I have your 3 packs, I will ask you to complete one final questionnaire 
online. As we did before, I will now ask you to use the computer/laptop available in 
this room so you can complete this questionnaire.  
Before you start, let me just open the web link for the questionnaire. Ok, now that you 
have access to it, just follow the instructions when completing the questionnaire. 
However, if you have any queries whilst completing the questionnaires just let me 
know and I will help you. You can find me in room XXX, where I’ll wait for you to tell 
me when you’re finished.  
 [student accesses the questionnaires and is happy to continue] 
Ok, I will let you get on with it now. Remember, I’ll be in room XX in case you need 
any assistance. Otherwise, just let me know when you’re done. 
[student notifies researcher when he/she has finished the questionnaires] 
Thank you for completing the last questionnaire. 
Now, I’d like to debrief you about the study, by giving you this information for you to 
read first [had in the debrief form]. Once you finish reading this, let me know if you 
have any further questions. 
[student reads debrief and has no further questions:]  
Ok, brilliant. You can keep the debrief information if you want to. Before we finish 
today, I will now confirm you will: be awarded 4 course credits for your participation [if 
participant is a first year psychology student]/be entered into a prize draw for 
vouchers worth a total of £100 [if participant is not a first year psychology 
undergraduate]. 
Ok, thanks once again for agreeing to participate. Should you have any further 
questions you can always contact me on my email address. It was nice meeting you 
and wishing you all the best in your studies. 
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APPENDIX 7: INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Two weeks in the life of a university student: thoughts, feelings and 
experiences 
 
The study 
My name is Carla Matias and I am a Clinical Psychology doctoral student at Royal 
Holloway, University of London. I am carrying out a study focusing on thoughts, 
feelings and experiences in university students over a 2-week period, supervised by 
Dr. Jessica Kingston and Dr. Lyn Ellett.  
Contact information 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of the research, you can contact me on 
Carla.Matias.2012@live.rhul.ac.uk or call me on 01784 414105. If you need to 
contact Dr. Jessica Kingston, you can contact her by email on 
Jessica.Kingston@rhul.ac.uk or by phone on 01784 414105. 
Your participation in this research study would be greatly appreciated.  
How long will the study last? 
The study will be carried out over the course of 2 weeks. 
What do I have to do if I take part? 
The study consists of three main stages. 
Stage 1 will involve meeting with you at the Clinical Psychology Department (Bowyer 
Building) for approximately 1 hour. The plan for this meeting is to first introduce you 
to the study and answer any questions you may have about participating. You will 
then be asked whether you consent to take part. As part of consent, you will be 
asked to opt in to receiving an email prompting you to complete stage 2 of the study. 
Therefore, if you consent to taking part, you will be asked to confirm your email 
address. After you provide consent, I will then ask you to complete 6 questionnaires 
online and you will be given access to a departmental computer to do this. 
Completion of online measures will take about 30mins, after which I will give you 3 
questionnaire packs in a sealed envelope, labelled ‘pack 1’, ‘pack 2’, and ‘pack 3’, for 
you to take home with you to be able to complete stage 2 of the study.  We will also 
agree a time to meet for stage 3. 
In stage 2 you will receive 3 emails on random days during the 2-week period, 
following the completion of stage 1. After receiving the first email, you will need to 
complete the questionnaire pack labelled ‘pack 1’, which was given to you in stage 1.  
Equally, ‘pack 2’ and ‘pack 3’ will need to be completed after you receive the second 








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and third email prompts, respectively. You will need to be complete each pack as 
soon as you receive the email, and within 3 hours of receiving the initial email 
prompt. Each pack will take 5mins to complete. You will be required to return all 3 
completed packs to me when we meet for stage 3 of the study. 
Stage 3: at the end of the 2-week period, you will be meeting with me again at the 
Clinical Psychology Department (Bowyer Building) for approximately 20-30 minutes, 
during which I will collect your 3 completed questionnaire packs. I will then ask you to 
complete one questionnaire online, and you will be given access to a departmental 
computer to do this. This questionnaire will take about 10-15mins to complete. I will 
then answer any outstanding questions you may have and will fully debrief you about 
the study.  
What happens if I choose to participate? 
Once you have completed all 3 stages of the study, and unless you are a first year 
psychology student, in which case you will be granted 4 course credits for your 
participation, you will be entered into a prize draw for vouchers worth a total of £100 
(i.e. two vouchers worth £25 each, two vouchers worth £20 each and one voucher 
worth £10) as compensation for your participation in this study. 
Confidentiality 
Nobody except my supervisors and I will be allowed to see any of your data. In the 
study you will be identified by number only.  All information is completely confidential 
and will be stored securely at all stages of the study. Once your participation in the 
study has ended, your contact information (email address) will be deleted.  
Purpose of the study 
This study is important in contributing knowledge about the relationship between 
thoughts, feelings, and individual experiences in students. This study has been 
subject to review and approval by the Psychology Department Ethics Committee.  
Do I have to take part? 
You do not have to take part in this study if you do not want to. It is entirely voluntary. 
If you decide to take part, you are free to decline answering any questions that you 
do not want to, and you may withdraw at any time without having to give a reason. 
Your decision whether or not to take part will not affect your education in any way. 
Will the study impact on my wellbeing? 
Some people may find that repeatedly reflecting on thoughts, feelings and 
experiences over the 2-week period may affect their mood. Although such 
experiences are not expected to have a lasting effect, if at any stage of your 
participation in this study, you have any concerns about your wellbeing, please 
contact the University Counselling Service on counselling@rhul.ac.uk or 01784 
443128, the Samaritans (08457 90 90 90), and/or your GP.  
Please keep this part of the sheet for your own reference. Please feel free to ask any 
questions before you complete the consent form below, then tear off and hand the 
completed consent form to the researcher.  
 
 176
APPENDIX 8: CONSENT FORM 
 
Two weeks in the life of a university student: thoughts, feelings and 
experiences 
ID Number: …………………………… 
You have been asked to participate in a study focusing on thoughts, feelings and 
experiences in university students over a 2-week period. 
Have you (please circle yes or no): 
Read the information sheet about the study?  YES NO 
Had an opportunity to ask questions?   YES  NO 
Got satisfactory answers to your questions?   YES NO 
Understood that you’re free to withdraw from the study 
 at any time without giving a reason (and without  
affecting your education)?     YES NO 
 
Understood that you are free to decline answering  
any questions that you do not want to?   YES NO 
 
Understood that to complete stage 2, you will be  
required to opt in to an email prompting you to 
complete each of the 3 questionnaire packs?  YES NO 
 
Understood that each questionnaire pack needs to be  
completed as soon as possible and within 3hrs of  
receiving each email prompt?    YES  NO 
 
Understood you can seek support/advice from your  
GP, Samaritans and/or University Counselling  
Service if you have any concerns about your  
wellbeing at any stage of the study?    YES  NO  
 
Do you agree to take part in the study?   YES  NO 
     
Signature________________ Name in block 
letters ___________________ 
Date _____________  
 
NB: This consent form and your email address will be stored separately  
from the anonymous information you provide. 
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APPENDIX 9: DEBRIEF FORM 
 
Two weeks in the life of a university student: thoughts, feelings and 
experiences 
 
Thank you for your participation in this study. 
The aims and hypotheses of this study were not made explicit prior to data collection. 
This was done to ensure participants do not alter their behaviour whilst participating 
in the study. A summary of the background and aims of the study is presented below. 
Background of the study 
In this study we were interested in understanding suspicious or ‘paranoid-like’ 
thoughts in students. Previous research has suggested such thoughts are common 
in the normal population, occur in every day life and are associated with feelings of 
anger and frustration as well as having an impact on behaviour. It is also thought that 
certain factors may serve to protect against or exacerbate these ‘paranoid-like’ 
experiences.  
Aims of the study 
The main aim of the study was to find out more about paranoia-like experiences in 
students, and how such experiences may affect thoughts, feelings, and everyday 
behaviour. Therefore, this study replicated the methodology previously used by 
another researcher, which consists of a questionnaire focusing on personalised 
accounts of paranoid-like experiences, differentiating between feelings, thoughts and 
behaviour.  
Previously, researchers have also shown that people admitting to having suspicious 
or paranoid-like thoughts are also more likely to experience increased worry and/or 
have a tendency to be highly self-centred (i.e. preoccupied with how one is 
seen/perceived by others). Recently, it has also been suggested that an increased 
ability to be aware and accepting of one’s difficult thoughts and feelings may help 
prevent the occurrence of paranoid-like experiences. Thus, another aim of the study 
was to understand the factors that over time may trigger paranoid-like experiences in 
everyday life.  
We were also interested in exploring whether there is a link between paranoid-like 
thoughts/feelings and behaviour among students. This will help in gaining a better 
understanding about the types of behaviour, which may characterise paranoid-like 
experiences in nonclinical populations. This knowledge can also help in 
understanding whether those that are more prone to paranoid-like thinking, behave 
differently as a way of coping with these difficult thoughts/feelings. 








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Because it is very important that participants do not know the above information 
beforehand, please do not share this information with any other students. 
The potential impact of reflecting on paranoid experiences 
We sincerely hope that you have not experienced any adverse effects from taking 
part in this study. Some people may find that repeatedly reflecting on potentially 
distressing experiences (i.e., paranoia, rumination) over the 2-week period may 
affect their mood. However, if this study has had a lasting effect on your mood or if 
you have any concerns about your wellbeing having taken part, please contact the 
University Counselling Service on counselling@rhul.ac.uk or 01784 443128, the 
Samaritans (08457 90 90 90), and/or your GP.  
If you have any questions about this study or you would like to have a copy of the 
results, please contact me on Carla.Matias.2012@live.rhul.ac.uk or Dr. Jessica 
Kingston on Jessica.Kingston@rhul.ac.uk, and we will provide you with a summary of 
the findings. I’d like to remind you that your participation in this study was voluntary 
and you have the right to withdraw permission for your data to be used.  
Thank you again for your participation in this study.
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APPENDIX 10: RHUL ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL NOTIFICATION 
 
 From: Psychology-Webmaster@rhul.ac.uk <Psychology-Webmaster@rhul.ac.uk> 
Sent: 05 August 2014 10:23 
To: nxjt024@rhul.ac.uk; Kingston, Jessica; 
Cc: PSY-EthicsAdmin@rhul.ac.uk; Leman, Patrick; Lock, Annette; 
umjt001@rhul.ac.uk; 
Subject: Ref: 2014/080R1 Ethics Form Approved  
  

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Application Details: View the form click here   Revise the form click here  
   
Applicant Name:  Carla Fialho Matias 
   
Application title:  
Personal paranoid experiences in a nonclinical student 
sample: prediction from mindfulness, rumination and 
self-consciousness 
